alpine-overlay/kubezero/falco/falco_rules.yaml

#
# Copyright (C) 2023 The Falco Authors.
#
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
# You may obtain a copy of the License at
#
#     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
#

# Starting with version 8, the Falco engine supports exceptions.
# However the Falco rules file does not use them by default.
- required_engine_version: 17

# Currently disabled as read/write are ignored syscalls. The nearly
# similar open_write/open_read check for files being opened for
# reading/writing.
# - macro: write
#   condition: (syscall.type=write and fd.type in (file, directory))
# - macro: read
#   condition: (syscall.type=read and evt.dir=> and fd.type in (file, directory))

# Information about rules tags and fields can be found here: https://falco.org/docs/rules/#tags-for-current-falco-ruleset
# `tags` fields also include information about the type of workload inspection, Mitre Attack killchain phases and Mitre TTP code(s)
# Mitre Attack References:
# [1] https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/enterprise/
# [2] https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre/cti/master/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack.json

- macro: open_write
  condition: (evt.type in (open,openat,openat2) and evt.is_open_write=true and fd.typechar='f' and fd.num>=0)

- macro: open_read
  condition: (evt.type in (open,openat,openat2) and evt.is_open_read=true and fd.typechar='f' and fd.num>=0)

- macro: open_directory
  condition: (evt.type in (open,openat,openat2) and evt.is_open_read=true and fd.typechar='d' and fd.num>=0)

# Failed file open attempts, useful to detect threat actors making mistakes
# https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man3/errno.3.html
# evt.res=ENOENT - No such file or directory
# evt.res=EACCESS - Permission denied
- macro: open_file_failed
  condition: (evt.type in (open,openat,openat2) and fd.typechar='f' and fd.num=-1 and evt.res startswith E)

- macro: never_true
  condition: (evt.num=0)

- macro: always_true
  condition: (evt.num>=0)

# In some cases, such as dropped system call events, information about
# the process name may be missing. For some rules that really depend
# on the identity of the process performing an action such as opening
# a file, etc., we require that the process name be known.
- macro: proc_name_exists
  condition: (proc.name!="<NA>")

- macro: rename
  condition: (evt.type in (rename, renameat, renameat2))

- macro: mkdir
  condition: (evt.type in (mkdir, mkdirat))

- macro: remove
  condition: (evt.type in (rmdir, unlink, unlinkat))

- macro: modify
  condition: (rename or remove)

# %evt.arg.flags available for evt.dir=>, but only for umount2
# %evt.arg.name is path and available for evt.dir=<
# - macro: umount
#   condition: (evt.type in (umount, umount2))

- macro: spawned_process
  condition: (evt.type in (execve, execveat) and evt.dir=<)

- macro: create_symlink
  condition: (evt.type in (symlink, symlinkat) and evt.dir=<)

- macro: create_hardlink
  condition: (evt.type in (link, linkat) and evt.dir=<)

- macro: chmod
  condition: (evt.type in (chmod, fchmod, fchmodat) and evt.dir=<)

- macro: kernel_module_load
  condition: (evt.type in (init_module, finit_module) and evt.dir=<)

# File categories
- macro: bin_dir
  condition: (fd.directory in (/bin, /sbin, /usr/bin, /usr/sbin))

- macro: bin_dir_mkdir
  condition: >
     (evt.arg.path startswith /bin/ or
     evt.arg.path startswith /sbin/ or
     evt.arg.path startswith /usr/bin/ or
     evt.arg.path startswith /usr/sbin/)     

- macro: bin_dir_rename
  condition: >
     (evt.arg.path startswith /bin/ or
     evt.arg.path startswith /sbin/ or
     evt.arg.path startswith /usr/bin/ or
     evt.arg.path startswith /usr/sbin/ or
     evt.arg.name startswith /bin/ or
     evt.arg.name startswith /sbin/ or
     evt.arg.name startswith /usr/bin/ or
     evt.arg.name startswith /usr/sbin/ or
     evt.arg.oldpath startswith /bin/ or
     evt.arg.oldpath startswith /sbin/ or
     evt.arg.oldpath startswith /usr/bin/ or
     evt.arg.oldpath startswith /usr/sbin/ or
     evt.arg.newpath startswith /bin/ or
     evt.arg.newpath startswith /sbin/ or
     evt.arg.newpath startswith /usr/bin/ or
     evt.arg.newpath startswith /usr/sbin/)     

- macro: etc_dir
  condition: (fd.name startswith /etc/)

# This detects writes immediately below / or any write anywhere below /root
- macro: root_dir
  condition: (fd.directory=/ or fd.name startswith /root/)

- list: shell_binaries
  items: [ash, bash, csh, ksh, sh, tcsh, zsh, dash]

- list: ssh_binaries
  items: [
    sshd, sftp-server, ssh-agent,
    ssh, scp, sftp,
    ssh-keygen, ssh-keysign, ssh-keyscan, ssh-add
    ]

- list: shell_mgmt_binaries
  items: [add-shell, remove-shell]

- macro: shell_procs
  condition: proc.name in (shell_binaries)

- list: coreutils_binaries
  items: [
    truncate, sha1sum, numfmt, fmt, fold, uniq, cut, who,
    groups, csplit, sort, expand, printf, printenv, unlink, tee, chcon, stat,
    basename, split, nice, "yes", whoami, sha224sum, hostid, users, stdbuf,
    base64, unexpand, cksum, od, paste, nproc, pathchk, sha256sum, wc, test,
    comm, arch, du, factor, sha512sum, md5sum, tr, runcon, env, dirname,
    tsort, join, shuf, install, logname, pinky, nohup, expr, pr, tty, timeout,
    tail, "[", seq, sha384sum, nl, head, id, mkfifo, sum, dircolors, ptx, shred,
    tac, link, chroot, vdir, chown, touch, ls, dd, uname, "true", pwd, date,
    chgrp, chmod, mktemp, cat, mknod, sync, ln, "false", rm, mv, cp, echo,
    readlink, sleep, stty, mkdir, df, dir, rmdir, touch
    ]

# dpkg -L login | grep bin | xargs ls -ld | grep -v '^d' | awk '{print $9}' | xargs -L 1 basename | tr "\\n" ","
- list: login_binaries
  items: [
    login, systemd, '"(systemd)"', systemd-logind, su,
    nologin, faillog, lastlog, newgrp, sg
    ]

# dpkg -L passwd | grep bin | xargs ls -ld | grep -v '^d' | awk '{print $9}' | xargs -L 1 basename | tr "\\n" ","
- list: passwd_binaries
  items: [
    shadowconfig, grpck, pwunconv, grpconv, pwck,
    groupmod, vipw, pwconv, useradd, newusers, cppw, chpasswd, usermod,
    groupadd, groupdel, grpunconv, chgpasswd, userdel, chage, chsh,
    gpasswd, chfn, expiry, passwd, vigr, cpgr, adduser, addgroup, deluser, delgroup
    ]

# repoquery -l shadow-utils | grep bin | xargs ls -ld | grep -v '^d' |
#     awk '{print $9}' | xargs -L 1 basename | tr "\\n" ","
- list: shadowutils_binaries
  items: [
    chage, gpasswd, lastlog, newgrp, sg, adduser, deluser, chpasswd,
    groupadd, groupdel, addgroup, delgroup, groupmems, groupmod, grpck, grpconv, grpunconv,
    newusers, pwck, pwconv, pwunconv, useradd, userdel, usermod, vigr, vipw, unix_chkpwd
    ]

- list: sysdigcloud_binaries
  items: [setup-backend, dragent, sdchecks]

- list: k8s_binaries
  items: [hyperkube, skydns, kube2sky, exechealthz, weave-net, loopback, bridge, openshift-sdn, openshift]

- list: lxd_binaries
  items: [lxd, lxcfs]

- list: http_server_binaries
  items: [nginx, httpd, httpd-foregroun, lighttpd, apache, apache2]

- list: db_server_binaries
  items: [mysqld, postgres, sqlplus]

- list: postgres_mgmt_binaries
  items: [pg_dumpall, pg_ctl, pg_lsclusters, pg_ctlcluster]

- list: nosql_server_binaries
  items: [couchdb, memcached, redis-server, rabbitmq-server, mongod]

- list: gitlab_binaries
  items: [gitlab-shell, gitlab-mon, gitlab-runner-b, git]

- list: interpreted_binaries
  items: [lua, node, perl, perl5, perl6, php, python, python2, python3, ruby, tcl]

- macro: interpreted_procs
  condition: >
    (proc.name in (interpreted_binaries))    

- macro: server_procs
  condition: proc.name in (http_server_binaries, db_server_binaries, docker_binaries, sshd)

# The explicit quotes are needed to avoid the - characters being
# interpreted by the filter expression.
- list: rpm_binaries
  items: [dnf, dnf-automatic, rpm, rpmkey, yum, '"75-system-updat"', rhsmcertd-worke, rhsmcertd, subscription-ma,
          repoquery, rpmkeys, rpmq, yum-cron, yum-config-mana, yum-debug-dump,
          abrt-action-sav, rpmdb_stat, microdnf, rhn_check, yumdb]

- list: openscap_rpm_binaries
  items: [probe_rpminfo, probe_rpmverify, probe_rpmverifyfile, probe_rpmverifypackage]

- macro: rpm_procs
  condition: (proc.name in (rpm_binaries, openscap_rpm_binaries) or proc.name in (salt-call, salt-minion))

- list: deb_binaries
  items: [dpkg, dpkg-preconfigu, dpkg-reconfigur, dpkg-divert, apt, apt-get, aptitude,
    frontend, preinst, add-apt-reposit, apt-auto-remova, apt-key,
    apt-listchanges, unattended-upgr, apt-add-reposit, apt-cache, apt.systemd.dai
    ]
- list: python_package_managers
  items: [pip, pip3, conda]

# The truncated dpkg-preconfigu is intentional, process names are
# truncated at the falcosecurity-libs level.
- list: package_mgmt_binaries
  items: [rpm_binaries, deb_binaries, update-alternat, gem, npm, python_package_managers, sane-utils.post, alternatives, chef-client, apk, snapd]

- macro: package_mgmt_procs
  condition: proc.name in (package_mgmt_binaries)

- macro: package_mgmt_ancestor_procs
  condition: proc.pname in (package_mgmt_binaries) or
             proc.aname[2] in (package_mgmt_binaries) or
             proc.aname[3] in (package_mgmt_binaries) or
             proc.aname[4] in (package_mgmt_binaries)

- macro: coreos_write_ssh_dir
  condition: (proc.name=update-ssh-keys and fd.name startswith /home/core/.ssh)

- macro: run_by_package_mgmt_binaries
  condition: proc.aname in (package_mgmt_binaries, needrestart)

- list: ssl_mgmt_binaries
  items: [ca-certificates]

- list: dhcp_binaries
  items: [dhclient, dhclient-script, 11-dhclient]

# A canonical set of processes that run other programs with different
# privileges or as a different user.
- list: userexec_binaries
  items: [sudo, su, suexec, critical-stack, dzdo]

- list: known_setuid_binaries
  items: [
    sshd, dbus-daemon-lau, ping, ping6, critical-stack-, pmmcli,
    filemng, PassengerAgent, bwrap, osdetect, nginxmng, sw-engine-fpm,
    start-stop-daem
    ]

- list: user_mgmt_binaries
  items: [login_binaries, passwd_binaries, shadowutils_binaries]

- list: dev_creation_binaries
  items: [blkid, rename_device, update_engine, sgdisk]

- list: hids_binaries
  items: [aide, aide.wrapper, update-aide.con, logcheck, syslog-summary, osqueryd, ossec-syscheckd]

- list: vpn_binaries
  items: [openvpn]

- list: nomachine_binaries
  items: [nxexec, nxnode.bin, nxserver.bin, nxclient.bin]

- macro: system_procs
  condition: proc.name in (coreutils_binaries, user_mgmt_binaries)

- list: mail_binaries
  items: [
    sendmail, sendmail-msp, postfix, procmail, exim4,
    pickup, showq, mailq, dovecot, imap-login, imap,
    mailmng-core, pop3-login, dovecot-lda, pop3
    ]

- list: mail_config_binaries
  items: [
    update_conf, parse_mc, makemap_hash, newaliases, update_mk, update_tlsm4,
    update_db, update_mc, ssmtp.postinst, mailq, postalias, postfix.config.,
    postfix.config, postfix-script, postconf
    ]

- list: sensitive_file_names
  items: [/etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers, /etc/pam.conf, /etc/security/pwquality.conf]

- list: sensitive_directory_names
  items: [/, /etc, /etc/, /root, /root/]

- macro: sensitive_files
  condition: >
    fd.name startswith /etc and
    (fd.name in (sensitive_file_names)
     or fd.directory in (/etc/sudoers.d, /etc/pam.d))    

# Indicates that the process is new. Currently detected using time
# since process was started, using a threshold of 5 seconds.
- macro: proc_is_new
  condition: proc.duration <= 5000000000

# Network
- macro: inbound
  condition: >
    (((evt.type in (accept,accept4,listen) and evt.dir=<) or
      (evt.type in (recvfrom,recvmsg) and evt.dir=< and
       fd.l4proto != tcp and fd.connected=false and fd.name_changed=true)) and
     (fd.typechar = 4 or fd.typechar = 6) and
     (fd.ip != "0.0.0.0" and fd.net != "127.0.0.0/8") and
     (evt.rawres >= 0 or evt.res = EINPROGRESS))    

# RFC1918 addresses were assigned for private network usage
- list: rfc_1918_addresses
  items: ['"10.0.0.0/8"', '"172.16.0.0/12"', '"192.168.0.0/16"']

- macro: outbound
  condition: >
    (((evt.type = connect and evt.dir=<) or
      (evt.type in (sendto,sendmsg) and evt.dir=< and
       fd.l4proto != tcp and fd.connected=false and fd.name_changed=true)) and
     (fd.typechar = 4 or fd.typechar = 6) and
     (fd.ip != "0.0.0.0" and fd.net != "127.0.0.0/8" and not fd.snet in (rfc_1918_addresses)) and
     (evt.rawres >= 0 or evt.res = EINPROGRESS))    

# Very similar to inbound/outbound, but combines the tests together
# for efficiency.
- macro: inbound_outbound
  condition: >
    ((((evt.type in (accept,accept4,listen,connect) and evt.dir=<)) and
     (fd.typechar = 4 or fd.typechar = 6)) and
     (fd.ip != "0.0.0.0" and fd.net != "127.0.0.0/8") and
     (evt.rawres >= 0 or evt.res = EINPROGRESS))    

- macro: ssh_port
  condition: fd.sport=22

# In a local/user rules file, you could override this macro to
# enumerate the servers for which ssh connections are allowed. For
# example, you might have a ssh gateway host for which ssh connections
# are allowed.
#
# In the main falco rules file, there isn't any way to know the
# specific hosts for which ssh access is allowed, so this macro just
# repeats ssh_port, which effectively allows ssh from all hosts. In
# the overridden macro, the condition would look something like
# "fd.sip="a.b.c.d" or fd.sip="e.f.g.h" or ..."
- macro: allowed_ssh_hosts
  condition: ssh_port

- rule: Disallowed SSH Connection
  desc: Detect any new ssh connection to a host other than those in an allowed group of hosts
  condition: (inbound_outbound) and ssh_port and not allowed_ssh_hosts
  enabled: false
  output: Disallowed SSH Connection (command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid connection=%fd.name user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
  priority: NOTICE
  tags: [host, container, network, mitre_command_and_control, mitre_lateral_movement, T1021.004]

# These rules and supporting macros are more of an example for how to
# use the fd.*ip and fd.*ip.name fields to match connection
# information against ips, netmasks, and complete domain names.
#
# To use this rule, you should enable it and
# populate allowed_{source,destination}_{ipaddrs,networks,domains} with the
# values that make sense for your environment.

# Note that this can be either individual IPs or netmasks
- list: allowed_outbound_destination_ipaddrs
  items: ['"127.0.0.1"', '"8.8.8.8"']

- list: allowed_outbound_destination_networks
  items: ['"127.0.0.1/8"']

- list: allowed_outbound_destination_domains
  items: [google.com, www.yahoo.com]

- rule: Unexpected outbound connection destination
  desc: Detect any outbound connection to a destination outside of an allowed set of ips, networks, or domain names
  condition: >
    outbound and not
    ((fd.sip in (allowed_outbound_destination_ipaddrs)) or
     (fd.snet in (allowed_outbound_destination_networks)) or
     (fd.sip.name in (allowed_outbound_destination_domains)))    
  enabled: false
  output: Disallowed outbound connection destination (command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid connection=%fd.name user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
  priority: NOTICE
  tags: [host, container, network, mitre_command_and_control, TA0011]

- list: allowed_inbound_source_ipaddrs
  items: ['"127.0.0.1"']

- list: allowed_inbound_source_networks
  items: ['"127.0.0.1/8"', '"10.0.0.0/8"']

- list: allowed_inbound_source_domains
  items: [google.com]

- rule: Unexpected inbound connection source
  desc: Detect any inbound connection from a source outside of an allowed set of ips, networks, or domain names
  condition: >
    inbound and not
    ((fd.cip in (allowed_inbound_source_ipaddrs)) or
     (fd.cnet in (allowed_inbound_source_networks)) or
     (fd.cip.name in (allowed_inbound_source_domains)))    
  enabled: false
  output: Disallowed inbound connection source (command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid connection=%fd.name user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
  priority: NOTICE
  tags: [host, container, network, mitre_command_and_control, TA0011]

- list: bash_config_filenames
  items: [.bashrc, .bash_profile, .bash_history, .bash_login, .bash_logout, .inputrc, .profile]

- list: bash_config_files
  items: [/etc/profile, /etc/bashrc]

# Covers both csh and tcsh
- list: csh_config_filenames
  items: [.cshrc, .login, .logout, .history, .tcshrc, .cshdirs]

- list: csh_config_files
  items: [/etc/csh.cshrc, /etc/csh.login]

- list: zsh_config_filenames
  items: [.zshenv, .zprofile, .zshrc, .zlogin, .zlogout]

- list: shell_config_filenames
  items: [bash_config_filenames, csh_config_filenames, zsh_config_filenames]

- list: shell_config_files
  items: [bash_config_files, csh_config_files]

- list: shell_config_directories
  items: [/etc/zsh]

- macro: user_known_shell_config_modifiers
  condition: (never_true)

- rule: Modify Shell Configuration File
  desc: Detect attempt to modify shell configuration files
  condition: >
    open_write and
    (fd.filename in (shell_config_filenames) or
     fd.name in (shell_config_files) or
     fd.directory in (shell_config_directories))
    and not proc.name in (shell_binaries)
    and not exe_running_docker_save
    and not user_known_shell_config_modifiers    
  output: >
    a shell configuration file has been modified (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline file=%fd.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)    
  priority:
    WARNING
  tags: [host, container, filesystem, mitre_persistence, T1546.004]

# This rule is not enabled by default, as there are many legitimate
# readers of shell config files.
- rule: Read Shell Configuration File
  desc: Detect attempts to read shell configuration files by non-shell programs
  condition: >
    open_read and
    (fd.filename in (shell_config_filenames) or
     fd.name in (shell_config_files) or
     fd.directory in (shell_config_directories)) and
    (not proc.name in (shell_binaries))    
  enabled: false
  output: >
    a shell configuration file was read by a non-shell program (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid file=%fd.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)    
  priority:
    WARNING
  tags: [host, container, filesystem, mitre_discovery, T1546.004]

- macro: user_known_cron_jobs
  condition: (never_true)

- rule: Schedule Cron Jobs
  desc: Detect cron jobs scheduled
  condition: >
    ((open_write and fd.name startswith /etc/cron) or
     (spawned_process and proc.name = "crontab")) and
    not user_known_cron_jobs    
  enabled: false
  output: >
    Cron jobs were scheduled to run (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid
    file=%fd.name container_id=%container.id container_name=%container.name image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag)    
  priority:
    NOTICE
  tags: [host, container, filesystem, mitre_persistence, T1053.003]

# Use this to test whether the event occurred within a container.

# When displaying container information in the output field, use
# %container.info, without any leading term (file=%fd.name
# %container.info user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid, and not file=%fd.name
# container=%container.info user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid). The output will change
# based on the context and whether or not -pk/-pm/-pc was specified on
# the command line.
- macro: container
  condition: (container.id != host)

- macro: container_started
  condition: >
    ((evt.type = container or
     (spawned_process and proc.vpid=1)) and
     container.image.repository != incomplete)    

- macro: interactive
  condition: >
    ((proc.aname=sshd and proc.name != sshd) or
    proc.name=systemd-logind or proc.name=login)    

- list: cron_binaries
  items: [anacron, cron, crond, crontab]

# https://github.com/liske/needrestart
- list: needrestart_binaries
  items: [needrestart, 10-dpkg, 20-rpm, 30-pacman]

# Possible scripts run by sshkit
- list: sshkit_script_binaries
  items: [10_etc_sudoers., 10_passwd_group]

- list: plesk_binaries
  items: [sw-engine, sw-engine-fpm, sw-engine-kv, filemng, f2bmng]

# System users that should never log into a system. Consider adding your own
# service users (e.g. 'apache' or 'mysqld') here.
- macro: system_users
  condition: user.name in (bin, daemon, games, lp, mail, nobody, sshd, sync, uucp, www-data)

- macro: httpd_writing_ssl_conf
  condition: >
    (proc.pname=run-httpd and
     (proc.cmdline startswith "sed -ri" or proc.cmdline startswith "sed -i") and
     (fd.name startswith /etc/httpd/conf.d/ or fd.name startswith /etc/httpd/conf))    

- macro: userhelper_writing_etc_security
  condition: (proc.name=userhelper and fd.name startswith /etc/security)

- macro: ansible_running_python
  condition: (proc.name in (python, pypy, python3) and proc.cmdline contains ansible)

- macro: python_running_chef
  condition: (proc.name=python and (proc.cmdline contains yum-dump.py or proc.cmdline="python /usr/bin/chef-monitor.py"))

- macro: python_running_denyhosts
  condition: >
    (proc.name=python and
    (proc.cmdline contains /usr/sbin/denyhosts or
     proc.cmdline contains /usr/local/bin/denyhosts.py))    

# Qualys seems to run a variety of shell subprocesses, at various
# levels. This checks at a few levels without the cost of a full
# proc.aname, which traverses the full parent hierarchy.
- macro: run_by_qualys
  condition: >
    (proc.pname=qualys-cloud-ag or
     proc.aname[2]=qualys-cloud-ag or
     proc.aname[3]=qualys-cloud-ag or
     proc.aname[4]=qualys-cloud-ag)    

- macro: run_by_sumologic_securefiles
  condition: >
    ((proc.cmdline="usermod -a -G sumologic_collector" or
      proc.cmdline="groupadd sumologic_collector") and
     (proc.pname=secureFiles.sh and proc.aname[2]=java))    

- macro: run_by_yum
  condition: ((proc.pname=sh and proc.aname[2]=yum) or
              (proc.aname[2]=sh and proc.aname[3]=yum))

- macro: run_by_ms_oms
  condition: >
    (proc.aname[3] startswith omsagent- or
     proc.aname[3] startswith scx-)    

- macro: run_by_google_accounts_daemon
  condition: >
    (proc.aname[1] startswith google_accounts or
     proc.aname[2] startswith google_accounts or
     proc.aname[3] startswith google_accounts)    

# Chef is similar.
- macro: run_by_chef
  condition: (proc.aname[2]=chef_command_wr or proc.aname[3]=chef_command_wr or
              proc.aname[2]=chef-client or proc.aname[3]=chef-client or
              proc.name=chef-client)

- macro: run_by_adclient
  condition: (proc.aname[2]=adclient or proc.aname[3]=adclient or proc.aname[4]=adclient)

- macro: run_by_centrify
  condition: (proc.aname[2]=centrify or proc.aname[3]=centrify or proc.aname[4]=centrify)

# Also handles running semi-indirectly via scl
- macro: run_by_foreman
  condition: >
    (user.name=foreman and
     ((proc.pname in (rake, ruby, scl) and proc.aname[5] in (tfm-rake,tfm-ruby)) or
     (proc.pname=scl and proc.aname[2] in (tfm-rake,tfm-ruby))))    

- macro: java_running_sdjagent
  condition: proc.name=java and proc.cmdline contains sdjagent.jar

- macro: kubelet_running_loopback
  condition: (proc.pname=kubelet and proc.name=loopback)

- macro: python_mesos_marathon_scripting
  condition: (proc.pcmdline startswith "python3 /marathon-lb/marathon_lb.py")

- macro: splunk_running_forwarder
  condition: (proc.pname=splunkd and proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c /opt/splunkforwarder")

- macro: parent_supervise_running_multilog
  condition: (proc.name=multilog and proc.pname=supervise)

- macro: supervise_writing_status
  condition: (proc.name in (supervise,svc) and fd.name startswith "/etc/sb/")

- macro: pki_realm_writing_realms
  condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "bash /usr/local/lib/pki/pki-realm" and fd.name startswith /etc/pki/realms)

- macro: htpasswd_writing_passwd
  condition: (proc.name=htpasswd and fd.name=/etc/nginx/.htpasswd)

- macro: lvprogs_writing_conf
  condition: >
    (proc.name in (dmeventd,lvcreate,pvscan,lvs) and
     (fd.name startswith /etc/lvm/archive or
      fd.name startswith /etc/lvm/backup or
      fd.name startswith /etc/lvm/cache))    

- macro: ovsdb_writing_openvswitch
  condition: (proc.name=ovsdb-server and fd.directory=/etc/openvswitch)

- macro: perl_running_plesk
  condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "perl /opt/psa/admin/bin/plesk_agent_manager" or
              proc.pcmdline startswith "perl /opt/psa/admin/bin/plesk_agent_manager")

- macro: perl_running_updmap
  condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "perl /usr/bin/updmap")

- macro: perl_running_centrifydc
  condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "perl /usr/share/centrifydc")

- macro: runuser_reading_pam
  condition: (proc.name=runuser and fd.directory=/etc/pam.d)

# CIS Linux Benchmark program
- macro: linux_bench_reading_etc_shadow
  condition: ((proc.aname[2]=linux-bench and
               proc.name in (awk,cut,grep)) and
              (fd.name=/etc/shadow or
               fd.directory=/etc/pam.d))

- macro: parent_ucf_writing_conf
  condition: (proc.pname=ucf and proc.aname[2]=frontend)

- macro: consul_template_writing_conf
  condition: >
    ((proc.name=consul-template and fd.name startswith /etc/haproxy) or
     (proc.name=reload.sh and proc.aname[2]=consul-template and fd.name startswith /etc/ssl))    

- macro: countly_writing_nginx_conf
  condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "nodejs /opt/countly/bin" and fd.name startswith /etc/nginx)

- list: ms_oms_binaries
  items: [omi.postinst, omsconfig.posti, scx.postinst, omsadmin.sh, omiagent]

- macro: ms_oms_writing_conf
  condition: >
    ((proc.name in (omiagent,omsagent,in_heartbeat_r*,omsadmin.sh,PerformInventor,dsc_host)
       or proc.pname in (ms_oms_binaries)
       or proc.aname[2] in (ms_oms_binaries))
     and (fd.name startswith /etc/opt/omi or fd.name startswith /etc/opt/microsoft/omsagent))    

- macro: ms_scx_writing_conf
  condition: (proc.name in (GetLinuxOS.sh) and fd.name startswith /etc/opt/microsoft/scx)

- macro: azure_scripts_writing_conf
  condition: (proc.pname startswith "bash /var/lib/waagent/" and fd.name startswith /etc/azure)

- macro: azure_networkwatcher_writing_conf
  condition: (proc.name in (NetworkWatcherA) and fd.name=/etc/init.d/AzureNetworkWatcherAgent)

- macro: couchdb_writing_conf
  condition: (proc.name=beam.smp and proc.cmdline contains couchdb and fd.name startswith /etc/couchdb)

- macro: update_texmf_writing_conf
  condition: (proc.name=update-texmf and fd.name startswith /etc/texmf)

- macro: slapadd_writing_conf
  condition: (proc.name=slapadd and fd.name startswith /etc/ldap)

- macro: openldap_writing_conf
  condition: (proc.pname=run-openldap.sh and fd.name startswith /etc/openldap)

- macro: ucpagent_writing_conf
  condition: (proc.name=apiserver and container.image.repository=docker/ucp-agent and fd.name=/etc/authorization_config.cfg)

- macro: iscsi_writing_conf
  condition: (proc.name=iscsiadm and fd.name startswith /etc/iscsi)

- macro: istio_writing_conf
  condition: (proc.name=pilot-agent and fd.name startswith /etc/istio)

- macro: symantec_writing_conf
  condition: >
    ((proc.name=symcfgd and fd.name startswith /etc/symantec) or
     (proc.name=navdefutil and fd.name=/etc/symc-defutils.conf))    

- macro: liveupdate_writing_conf
  condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "java LiveUpdate" and fd.name in (/etc/liveupdate.conf, /etc/Product.Catalog.JavaLiveUpdate))

- macro: rancher_agent
  condition: (proc.name=agent and container.image.repository contains "rancher/agent")

- macro: rancher_network_manager
  condition: (proc.name=rancher-bridge and container.image.repository contains "rancher/network-manager")

- macro: sosreport_writing_files
  condition: >
    (proc.name=urlgrabber-ext- and proc.aname[3]=sosreport and
     (fd.name startswith /etc/pkt/nssdb or fd.name startswith /etc/pki/nssdb))    

- macro: pkgmgmt_progs_writing_pki
  condition: >
    (proc.name=urlgrabber-ext- and proc.pname in (yum, yum-cron, repoquery) and
     (fd.name startswith /etc/pkt/nssdb or fd.name startswith /etc/pki/nssdb))    

- macro: update_ca_trust_writing_pki
  condition: (proc.pname=update-ca-trust and proc.name=trust and fd.name startswith /etc/pki)

- macro: brandbot_writing_os_release
  condition: proc.name=brandbot and fd.name=/etc/os-release

- macro: selinux_writing_conf
  condition: (proc.name in (semodule,genhomedircon,sefcontext_comp) and fd.name startswith /etc/selinux)

- list: veritas_binaries
  items: [vxconfigd, sfcache, vxclustadm, vxdctl, vxprint, vxdmpadm, vxdisk, vxdg, vxassist, vxtune]

- macro: veritas_driver_script
  condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "perl /opt/VRTSsfmh/bin/mh_driver.pl")

- macro: veritas_progs
  condition: (proc.name in (veritas_binaries) or veritas_driver_script)

- macro: veritas_writing_config
  condition: (veritas_progs and (fd.name startswith /etc/vx or fd.name startswith /etc/opt/VRTS or fd.name startswith /etc/vom))

- macro: nginx_writing_conf
  condition: (proc.name in (nginx,nginx-ingress-c,nginx-ingress) and (fd.name startswith /etc/nginx or fd.name startswith /etc/ingress-controller))

- macro: nginx_writing_certs
  condition: >
    (((proc.name=openssl and proc.pname=nginx-launch.sh) or proc.name=nginx-launch.sh) and fd.name startswith /etc/nginx/certs)    

- macro: chef_client_writing_conf
  condition: (proc.pcmdline startswith "chef-client /opt/gitlab" and fd.name startswith /etc/gitlab)

- macro: centrify_writing_krb
  condition: (proc.name in (adjoin,addns) and fd.name startswith /etc/krb5)

- macro: sssd_writing_krb
  condition: (proc.name=adcli and proc.aname[2]=sssd and fd.name startswith /etc/krb5)

- macro: cockpit_writing_conf
  condition: >
    ((proc.pname=cockpit-kube-la or proc.aname[2]=cockpit-kube-la)
     and fd.name startswith /etc/cockpit)    

- macro: ipsec_writing_conf
  condition: (proc.name=start-ipsec.sh and fd.directory=/etc/ipsec)

- macro: exe_running_docker_save
  condition: >
    proc.name = "exe"
    and (proc.cmdline contains "/var/lib/docker"
    or proc.cmdline contains "/var/run/docker")
    and proc.pname in (dockerd, docker, dockerd-current, docker-current)    

# Ideally we'd have a length check here as well but
# filterchecks don't have operators like len()
- macro: sed_temporary_file
  condition: (proc.name=sed and fd.name startswith "/etc/sed")

- macro: python_running_get_pip
  condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "python get-pip.py")

- macro: python_running_ms_oms
  condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "python /var/lib/waagent/")

- macro: gugent_writing_guestagent_log
  condition: (proc.name=gugent and fd.name=GuestAgent.log)

- macro: dse_writing_tmp
  condition: (proc.name=dse-entrypoint and fd.name=/root/tmp__)

- macro: zap_writing_state
  condition: (proc.name=java and proc.cmdline contains "jar /zap" and fd.name startswith /root/.ZAP)

- macro: airflow_writing_state
  condition: (proc.name=airflow and fd.name startswith /root/airflow)

- macro: rpm_writing_root_rpmdb
  condition: (proc.name=rpm and fd.directory=/root/.rpmdb)

- macro: maven_writing_groovy
  condition: (proc.name=java and proc.cmdline contains "classpath /usr/local/apache-maven" and fd.name startswith /root/.groovy)

- macro: chef_writing_conf
  condition: (proc.name=chef-client and fd.name startswith /root/.chef)

- macro: kubectl_writing_state
  condition: (proc.name in (kubectl,oc) and fd.name startswith /root/.kube)

- macro: java_running_cassandra
  condition: (proc.name=java and proc.cmdline contains "cassandra.jar")

- macro: cassandra_writing_state
  condition: (java_running_cassandra and fd.directory=/root/.cassandra)

# Istio
- macro: galley_writing_state
  condition: (proc.name=galley and fd.name in (known_istio_files))

- list: known_istio_files
  items: [/healthready, /healthliveness]

- macro: calico_writing_state
  condition: (proc.name=kube-controller and fd.name startswith /status.json and k8s.pod.name startswith calico)

- macro: calico_writing_envvars
  condition: (proc.name=start_runit and fd.name startswith "/etc/envvars" and container.image.repository endswith "calico/node")

- list: repository_files
  items: [sources.list]

- list: repository_directories
  items: [/etc/apt/sources.list.d, /etc/yum.repos.d, /etc/apt]

- macro: access_repositories
  condition: (fd.directory in (repository_directories) or
              (fd.name pmatch (repository_directories) and
               fd.filename in (repository_files)))

- macro: modify_repositories
  condition: (evt.arg.newpath pmatch (repository_directories))

- macro: user_known_update_package_registry
  condition: (never_true)

- rule: Update Package Repository
  desc: Detect package repositories get updated
  condition: >
    ((open_write and access_repositories) or (modify and modify_repositories))
    and not package_mgmt_procs
    and not package_mgmt_ancestor_procs
    and not exe_running_docker_save
    and not user_known_update_package_registry    
  output: >
    Repository files get updated (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline file=%fd.name newpath=%evt.arg.newpath container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)    
  priority:
    NOTICE
  tags: [host, container, filesystem, mitre_persistence, T1072]

# Users should overwrite this macro to specify conditions under which a
# write under the binary dir is ignored. For example, it may be okay to
# install a binary in the context of a ci/cd build.
- macro: user_known_write_below_binary_dir_activities
  condition: (never_true)

- rule: Write below binary dir
  desc: an attempt to write to any file below a set of binary directories
  condition: >
    bin_dir and evt.dir = < and open_write
    and not package_mgmt_procs
    and not exe_running_docker_save
    and not python_running_get_pip
    and not python_running_ms_oms
    and not user_known_write_below_binary_dir_activities    
  output: >
    File below a known binary directory opened for writing (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid
    command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid file=%fd.name parent=%proc.pname pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline gparent=%proc.aname[2] container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)    
  priority: ERROR
  tags: [host, container, filesystem, mitre_persistence, T1543]

# If you'd like to generally monitor a wider set of directories on top
# of the ones covered by the rule Write below binary dir, you can use
# the following rule and lists.
- list: monitored_directories
  items: [/boot, /lib, /lib64, /usr/lib, /usr/local/lib, /usr/local/sbin, /usr/local/bin, /root/.ssh]

- macro: user_ssh_directory
  condition: (fd.name contains '/.ssh/' and fd.name glob '/home/*/.ssh/*')

- macro: directory_traversal
  condition: (fd.nameraw contains '../' and fd.nameraw glob '*../*../*')

# google_accounts_(daemon)
- macro: google_accounts_daemon_writing_ssh
  condition: (proc.name=google_accounts and user_ssh_directory)

- macro: cloud_init_writing_ssh
  condition: (proc.name=cloud-init and user_ssh_directory)

- macro: mkinitramfs_writing_boot
  condition: (proc.pname in (mkinitramfs, update-initramf) and fd.directory=/boot)

- macro: monitored_dir
  condition: >
    (fd.directory in (monitored_directories)
     or user_ssh_directory)
    and not mkinitramfs_writing_boot    

# Add conditions to this macro (probably in a separate file,
# overwriting this macro) to allow for specific combinations of
# programs writing below monitored directories.
#
# Its default value is an expression that always is false, which
# becomes true when the "not ..." in the rule is applied.
- macro: user_known_write_monitored_dir_conditions
  condition: (never_true)

- rule: Write below monitored dir
  desc: an attempt to write to any file below a set of monitored directories
  condition: >
    evt.dir = < and open_write and monitored_dir
    and not package_mgmt_procs
    and not coreos_write_ssh_dir
    and not exe_running_docker_save
    and not python_running_get_pip
    and not python_running_ms_oms
    and not google_accounts_daemon_writing_ssh
    and not cloud_init_writing_ssh
    and not user_known_write_monitored_dir_conditions    
  output: >
    File below a monitored directory opened for writing (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid
    command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid file=%fd.name parent=%proc.pname pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline gparent=%proc.aname[2] container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)    
  priority: ERROR
  tags: [host, container, filesystem, mitre_persistence, T1543]

# ******************************************************************************
# * "Directory traversal monitored file read" requires FALCO_ENGINE_VERSION 13 *
# ******************************************************************************

- rule: Directory traversal monitored file read
  desc: >
    Web applications can be vulnerable to directory traversal attacks that allow accessing files outside of the web app's root directory (e.g. Arbitrary File Read bugs).
    System directories like /etc are typically accessed via absolute paths. Access patterns outside of this (here path traversal) can be regarded as suspicious.
    This rule includes failed file open attempts.    
  condition: (open_read or open_file_failed) and (etc_dir or user_ssh_directory or fd.name startswith /root/.ssh or fd.name contains "id_rsa") and directory_traversal and not proc.pname in (shell_binaries)
  enabled: true
  output: >
    Read monitored file via directory traversal (username=%user.name useruid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid program=%proc.name exe=%proc.exepath
    command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid parent=%proc.pname file=%fd.name fileraw=%fd.nameraw parent=%proc.pname
    gparent=%proc.aname[2] container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository returncode=%evt.res cwd=%proc.cwd)    
  priority: WARNING
  tags: [host, container, filesystem, mitre_discovery, mitre_exfiltration, mitre_credential_access, T1555, T1212, T1020, T1552, T1083]

# The rule below is disabled by default as many system management tools
# like ansible, etc can read these files/paths. Enable it using this macro.
- macro: user_known_read_ssh_information_activities
  condition: (never_true)

- rule: Read ssh information
  desc: Any attempt to read files below ssh directories by non-ssh programs
  condition: >
    ((open_read or open_directory) and
     (user_ssh_directory or fd.name startswith /root/.ssh) and
     not user_known_read_ssh_information_activities and
     not proc.name in (ssh_binaries))    
  enabled: false
  output: >
    ssh-related file/directory read by non-ssh program (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid
    command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid file=%fd.name parent=%proc.pname pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)    
  priority: ERROR
  tags: [host, container, filesystem, mitre_discovery, T1005]

- list: safe_etc_dirs
  items: [/etc/cassandra, /etc/ssl/certs/java, /etc/logstash, /etc/nginx/conf.d, /etc/container_environment, /etc/hrmconfig, /etc/fluent/configs.d. /etc/alertmanager]

- macro: fluentd_writing_conf_files
  condition: (proc.name=start-fluentd and fd.name in (/etc/fluent/fluent.conf, /etc/td-agent/td-agent.conf))

- macro: qualys_writing_conf_files
  condition: (proc.name=qualys-cloud-ag and fd.name=/etc/qualys/cloud-agent/qagent-log.conf)

- macro: git_writing_nssdb
  condition: (proc.name=git-remote-http and fd.directory=/etc/pki/nssdb)

- macro: plesk_writing_keys
  condition: (proc.name in (plesk_binaries) and fd.name startswith /etc/sw/keys)

- macro: plesk_install_writing_apache_conf
  condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "bash -hB /usr/lib/plesk-9.0/services/webserver.apache configure"
              and fd.name="/etc/apache2/apache2.conf.tmp")

- macro: plesk_running_mktemp
  condition: (proc.name=mktemp and proc.aname[3] in (plesk_binaries))

- macro: networkmanager_writing_resolv_conf
  condition: proc.aname[2]=nm-dispatcher and fd.name=/etc/resolv.conf

- macro: add_shell_writing_shells_tmp
  condition: (proc.name=add-shell and fd.name=/etc/shells.tmp)

- macro: duply_writing_exclude_files
  condition: (proc.name=touch and proc.pcmdline startswith "bash /usr/bin/duply" and fd.name startswith "/etc/duply")

- macro: xmlcatalog_writing_files
  condition: (proc.name=update-xmlcatal and fd.directory=/etc/xml)

- macro: datadog_writing_conf
  condition: ((proc.cmdline startswith "python /opt/datadog-agent" or
               proc.cmdline startswith "entrypoint.sh /entrypoint.sh datadog start" or
               proc.cmdline startswith "agent.py /opt/datadog-agent")
              and fd.name startswith "/etc/dd-agent")

- macro: rancher_writing_conf
  condition: ((proc.name in (healthcheck, lb-controller, rancher-dns)) and
              (container.image.repository contains "rancher/healthcheck" or
               container.image.repository contains "rancher/lb-service-haproxy" or
               container.image.repository contains "rancher/dns") and
              (fd.name startswith "/etc/haproxy" or fd.name startswith "/etc/rancher-dns"))

- macro: rancher_writing_root
  condition: (proc.name=rancher-metadat and
              (container.image.repository contains "rancher/metadata" or container.image.repository contains "rancher/lb-service-haproxy") and
              fd.name startswith "/answers.json")

- macro: checkpoint_writing_state
  condition: (proc.name=checkpoint and
              container.image.repository contains "coreos/pod-checkpointer" and
              fd.name startswith "/etc/kubernetes")

- macro: jboss_in_container_writing_passwd
  condition: >
    ((proc.cmdline="run-java.sh /opt/jboss/container/java/run/run-java.sh"
      or proc.cmdline="run-java.sh /opt/run-java/run-java.sh")
     and container
     and fd.name=/etc/passwd)    

- macro: curl_writing_pki_db
  condition: (proc.name=curl and fd.directory=/etc/pki/nssdb)

- macro: haproxy_writing_conf
  condition: ((proc.name in (update-haproxy-,haproxy_reload.) or proc.pname in (update-haproxy-,haproxy_reload,haproxy_reload.))
               and (fd.name=/etc/openvpn/client.map or fd.name startswith /etc/haproxy))

- macro: java_writing_conf
  condition: (proc.name=java and fd.name=/etc/.java/.systemPrefs/.system.lock)

- macro: rabbitmq_writing_conf
  condition: (proc.name=rabbitmq-server and fd.directory=/etc/rabbitmq)

- macro: rook_writing_conf
  condition: (proc.name=toolbox.sh and container.image.repository=rook/toolbox
              and fd.directory=/etc/ceph)

- macro: httpd_writing_conf_logs
  condition: (proc.name=httpd and fd.name startswith /etc/httpd/)

- macro: mysql_writing_conf
  condition: >
    ((proc.name in (start-mysql.sh, run-mysqld) or proc.pname=start-mysql.sh) and
     (fd.name startswith /etc/mysql or fd.directory=/etc/my.cnf.d))    

- macro: redis_writing_conf
  condition: >
    (proc.name in (run-redis, redis-launcher.) and (fd.name=/etc/redis.conf or fd.name startswith /etc/redis))    

- macro: openvpn_writing_conf
  condition: (proc.name in (openvpn,openvpn-entrypo) and fd.name startswith /etc/openvpn)

- macro: php_handlers_writing_conf
  condition: (proc.name=php_handlers_co and fd.name=/etc/psa/php_versions.json)

- macro: sed_writing_temp_file
  condition: >
    ((proc.aname[3]=cron_start.sh and fd.name startswith /etc/security/sed) or
     (proc.name=sed and (fd.name startswith /etc/apt/sources.list.d/sed or
                         fd.name startswith /etc/apt/sed or
                         fd.name startswith /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/sed)))    

- macro: cron_start_writing_pam_env
  condition: (proc.cmdline="bash /usr/sbin/start-cron" and fd.name=/etc/security/pam_env.conf)

# In some cases dpkg-reconfigur runs commands that modify /etc. Not
# putting the full set of package management programs yet.
- macro: dpkg_scripting
  condition: (proc.aname[2] in (dpkg-reconfigur, dpkg-preconfigu))

- macro: ufw_writing_conf
  condition: (proc.name=ufw and fd.directory=/etc/ufw)

- macro: calico_writing_conf
  condition: >
    (((proc.name = calico-node) or
      (container.image.repository=gcr.io/projectcalico-org/node and proc.name in (start_runit, cp)) or
      (container.image.repository=gcr.io/projectcalico-org/cni and proc.name=sed))
     and fd.name startswith /etc/calico)    

- macro: prometheus_conf_writing_conf
  condition: (proc.name=prometheus-conf and fd.name startswith /etc/prometheus/config_out)

- macro: openshift_writing_conf
  condition: (proc.name=oc and fd.name startswith /etc/origin/node)

- macro: keepalived_writing_conf
  condition: (proc.name in (keepalived, kube-keepalived) and fd.name=/etc/keepalived/keepalived.conf)

- macro: etcd_manager_updating_dns
  condition: (container and proc.name=etcd-manager and fd.name=/etc/hosts)

- macro: automount_using_mtab
  condition: (proc.pname = automount and fd.name startswith /etc/mtab)

- macro: mcafee_writing_cma_d
  condition: (proc.name=macompatsvc and fd.directory=/etc/cma.d)

- macro: avinetworks_supervisor_writing_ssh
  condition: >
    (proc.cmdline="se_supervisor.p /opt/avi/scripts/se_supervisor.py -d" and
      (fd.name startswith /etc/ssh/known_host_ or
       fd.name startswith /etc/ssh/ssh_monitor_config_ or
       fd.name startswith /etc/ssh/ssh_config_))    

- macro: multipath_writing_conf
  condition: (proc.name = multipath and fd.name startswith /etc/multipath/)

# Add conditions to this macro (probably in a separate file,
# overwriting this macro) to allow for specific combinations of
# programs writing below specific directories below
# /etc. fluentd_writing_conf_files is a good example to follow, as it
# specifies both the program doing the writing as well as the specific
# files it is allowed to modify.
#
# In this file, it just takes one of the programs in the base macro
# and repeats it.

- macro: user_known_write_etc_conditions
  condition: proc.name=confd

# This is a placeholder for user to extend the whitelist for write below etc rule
- macro: user_known_write_below_etc_activities
  condition: (never_true)

- macro: calico_node
  condition: (container.image.repository endswith calico/node and proc.name=calico-node)

- macro: write_etc_common
  condition: >
    etc_dir and evt.dir = < and open_write
    and proc_name_exists
    and not proc.name in (passwd_binaries, shadowutils_binaries, sysdigcloud_binaries,
                          package_mgmt_binaries, ssl_mgmt_binaries, dhcp_binaries,
                          dev_creation_binaries, shell_mgmt_binaries,
                          mail_config_binaries,
                          sshkit_script_binaries,
                          ldconfig.real, ldconfig, confd, gpg, insserv,
                          apparmor_parser, update-mime, tzdata.config, tzdata.postinst,
                          systemd, systemd-machine, systemd-sysuser,
                          debconf-show, rollerd, bind9.postinst, sv,
                          gen_resolvconf., update-ca-certi, certbot, runsv,
                          qualys-cloud-ag, locales.postins, nomachine_binaries,
                          adclient, certutil, crlutil, pam-auth-update, parallels_insta,
                          openshift-launc, update-rc.d, puppet, falcoctl)
    and not (container and proc.cmdline in ("cp /run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/anchors/openshift-ca.crt"))
    and not proc.pname in (sysdigcloud_binaries, mail_config_binaries, hddtemp.postins, sshkit_script_binaries, locales.postins, deb_binaries, dhcp_binaries)
    and not fd.name pmatch (safe_etc_dirs)
    and not fd.name in (/etc/container_environment.sh, /etc/container_environment.json, /etc/motd, /etc/motd.svc)
    and not sed_temporary_file
    and not exe_running_docker_save
    and not ansible_running_python
    and not python_running_denyhosts
    and not fluentd_writing_conf_files
    and not user_known_write_etc_conditions
    and not run_by_centrify
    and not run_by_adclient
    and not qualys_writing_conf_files
    and not git_writing_nssdb
    and not plesk_writing_keys
    and not plesk_install_writing_apache_conf
    and not plesk_running_mktemp
    and not networkmanager_writing_resolv_conf
    and not run_by_chef
    and not add_shell_writing_shells_tmp
    and not duply_writing_exclude_files
    and not xmlcatalog_writing_files
    and not parent_supervise_running_multilog
    and not supervise_writing_status
    and not pki_realm_writing_realms
    and not htpasswd_writing_passwd
    and not lvprogs_writing_conf
    and not ovsdb_writing_openvswitch
    and not datadog_writing_conf
    and not curl_writing_pki_db
    and not haproxy_writing_conf
    and not java_writing_conf
    and not dpkg_scripting
    and not parent_ucf_writing_conf
    and not rabbitmq_writing_conf
    and not rook_writing_conf
    and not php_handlers_writing_conf
    and not sed_writing_temp_file
    and not cron_start_writing_pam_env
    and not httpd_writing_conf_logs
    and not mysql_writing_conf
    and not openvpn_writing_conf
    and not consul_template_writing_conf
    and not countly_writing_nginx_conf
    and not ms_oms_writing_conf
    and not ms_scx_writing_conf
    and not azure_scripts_writing_conf
    and not azure_networkwatcher_writing_conf
    and not couchdb_writing_conf
    and not update_texmf_writing_conf
    and not slapadd_writing_conf
    and not symantec_writing_conf
    and not liveupdate_writing_conf
    and not sosreport_writing_files
    and not selinux_writing_conf
    and not veritas_writing_config
    and not nginx_writing_conf
    and not nginx_writing_certs
    and not chef_client_writing_conf
    and not centrify_writing_krb
    and not sssd_writing_krb
    and not cockpit_writing_conf
    and not ipsec_writing_conf
    and not httpd_writing_ssl_conf
    and not userhelper_writing_etc_security
    and not pkgmgmt_progs_writing_pki
    and not update_ca_trust_writing_pki
    and not brandbot_writing_os_release
    and not redis_writing_conf
    and not openldap_writing_conf
    and not ucpagent_writing_conf
    and not iscsi_writing_conf
    and not istio_writing_conf
    and not ufw_writing_conf
    and not calico_writing_conf
    and not calico_writing_envvars
    and not prometheus_conf_writing_conf
    and not openshift_writing_conf
    and not keepalived_writing_conf
    and not rancher_writing_conf
    and not checkpoint_writing_state
    and not jboss_in_container_writing_passwd
    and not etcd_manager_updating_dns
    and not user_known_write_below_etc_activities
    and not automount_using_mtab
    and not mcafee_writing_cma_d
    and not avinetworks_supervisor_writing_ssh
    and not multipath_writing_conf
    and not calico_node    

- rule: Write below etc
  desc: an attempt to write to any file below /etc
  condition: write_etc_common
  output: "File below /etc opened for writing (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid parent=%proc.pname pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline file=%fd.name program=%proc.name gparent=%proc.aname[2] ggparent=%proc.aname[3] gggparent=%proc.aname[4] container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)"
  priority: ERROR
  tags: [host, container, filesystem, mitre_persistence, T1098]

- list: known_root_files
  items: [/root/.monit.state, /root/.auth_tokens, /root/.bash_history, /root/.ash_history, /root/.aws/credentials,
          /root/.viminfo.tmp, /root/.lesshst, /root/.bzr.log, /root/.gitconfig.lock, /root/.babel.json, /root/.localstack,
          /root/.node_repl_history, /root/.mongorc.js, /root/.dbshell, /root/.augeas/history, /root/.rnd, /root/.wget-hsts, /health, /exec.fifo]

- list: known_root_directories
  items: [/root/.oracle_jre_usage, /root/.ssh, /root/.subversion, /root/.nami]

- macro: known_root_conditions
  condition: (fd.name startswith /root/orcexec.
              or fd.name startswith /root/.m2
              or fd.name startswith /root/.npm
              or fd.name startswith /root/.pki
              or fd.name startswith /root/.ivy2
              or fd.name startswith /root/.config/Cypress
              or fd.name startswith /root/.config/pulse
              or fd.name startswith /root/.config/configstore
              or fd.name startswith /root/jenkins/workspace
              or fd.name startswith /root/.jenkins
              or fd.name startswith /root/.cache
              or fd.name startswith /root/.sbt
              or fd.name startswith /root/.java
              or fd.name startswith /root/.glide
              or fd.name startswith /root/.sonar
              or fd.name startswith /root/.v8flag
              or fd.name startswith /root/infaagent
              or fd.name startswith /root/.local/lib/python
              or fd.name startswith /root/.pm2
              or fd.name startswith /root/.gnupg
              or fd.name startswith /root/.pgpass
              or fd.name startswith /root/.theano
              or fd.name startswith /root/.gradle
              or fd.name startswith /root/.android
              or fd.name startswith /root/.ansible
              or fd.name startswith /root/.crashlytics
              or fd.name startswith /root/.dbus
              or fd.name startswith /root/.composer
              or fd.name startswith /root/.gconf
              or fd.name startswith /root/.nv
              or fd.name startswith /root/.local/share/jupyter
              or fd.name startswith /root/oradiag_root
              or fd.name startswith /root/workspace
              or fd.name startswith /root/jvm
              or fd.name startswith /root/.node-gyp)

# Add conditions to this macro (probably in a separate file,
# overwriting this macro) to allow for specific combinations of
# programs writing below specific directories below
# / or /root.
#
# In this file, it just takes one of the condition in the base macro
# and repeats it.
- macro: user_known_write_root_conditions
  condition: fd.name=/root/.bash_history

# This is a placeholder for user to extend the whitelist for write below root rule
- macro: user_known_write_below_root_activities
  condition: (never_true)

- macro: runc_writing_exec_fifo
  condition: (proc.cmdline="runc:[1:CHILD] init" and fd.name=/exec.fifo)

- macro: runc_writing_var_lib_docker
  condition: (proc.cmdline="runc:[1:CHILD] init" and evt.arg.filename startswith /var/lib/docker)

- macro: mysqlsh_writing_state
  condition: (proc.name=mysqlsh and fd.directory=/root/.mysqlsh)

- rule: Write below root
  desc: an attempt to write to any file directly below / or /root
  condition: >
    root_dir and evt.dir = < and open_write
    and proc_name_exists
    and not fd.name in (known_root_files)
    and not fd.directory pmatch (known_root_directories)
    and not exe_running_docker_save
    and not gugent_writing_guestagent_log
    and not dse_writing_tmp
    and not zap_writing_state
    and not airflow_writing_state
    and not rpm_writing_root_rpmdb
    and not maven_writing_groovy
    and not chef_writing_conf
    and not kubectl_writing_state
    and not cassandra_writing_state
    and not galley_writing_state
    and not calico_writing_state
    and not rancher_writing_root
    and not runc_writing_exec_fifo
    and not mysqlsh_writing_state
    and not known_root_conditions
    and not user_known_write_root_conditions
    and not user_known_write_below_root_activities    
  output: "File below / or /root opened for writing (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid parent=%proc.pname file=%fd.name program=%proc.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)"
  priority: ERROR
  tags: [host, container, filesystem, mitre_persistence, TA0003]

- macro: cmp_cp_by_passwd
  condition: proc.name in (cmp, cp) and proc.pname in (passwd, run-parts)

- macro: user_known_read_sensitive_files_activities
  condition: (never_true)

- rule: Read sensitive file trusted after startup
  desc: >
    an attempt to read any sensitive file (e.g. files containing user/password/authentication
    information) by a trusted program after startup. Trusted programs might read these files
    at startup to load initial state, but not afterwards.    
  condition: sensitive_files and open_read and server_procs and not proc_is_new and proc.name!="sshd" and not user_known_read_sensitive_files_activities
  output: >
    Sensitive file opened for reading by trusted program after startup (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid
    command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid parent=%proc.pname file=%fd.name parent=%proc.pname gparent=%proc.aname[2] container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)    
  priority: WARNING
  tags: [host, container, filesystem, mitre_credential_access, T1555, T1212, T1020, T1552, T1083]

- list: read_sensitive_file_binaries
  items: [
    iptables, ps, lsb_release, check-new-relea, dumpe2fs, accounts-daemon, sshd,
    vsftpd, systemd, mysql_install_d, psql, screen, debconf-show, sa-update,
    pam-auth-update, pam-config, /usr/sbin/spamd, polkit-agent-he, lsattr, file, sosreport,
    scxcimservera, adclient, rtvscand, cockpit-session, userhelper, ossec-syscheckd
    ]

# Add conditions to this macro (probably in a separate file,
# overwriting this macro) to allow for specific combinations of
# programs accessing sensitive files.
# fluentd_writing_conf_files is a good example to follow, as it
# specifies both the program doing the writing as well as the specific
# files it is allowed to modify.
#
# In this file, it just takes one of the macros in the base rule
# and repeats it.

- macro: user_read_sensitive_file_conditions
  condition: cmp_cp_by_passwd

- list: read_sensitive_file_images
  items: []

- macro: user_read_sensitive_file_containers
  condition: (container and container.image.repository in (read_sensitive_file_images))

# This macro detects man-db postinst, see https://salsa.debian.org/debian/man-db/-/blob/master/debian/postinst
# The rule "Read sensitive file untrusted" use this macro to avoid FPs.
- macro: mandb_postinst
  condition: >
    (proc.name=perl and proc.args startswith "-e" and
    proc.args contains "@pwd = getpwnam(" and
    proc.args contains "exec " and
    proc.args contains "/usr/bin/mandb")    

- rule: Read sensitive file untrusted
  desc: >
    an attempt to read any sensitive file (e.g. files containing user/password/authentication
    information). Exceptions are made for known trusted programs.    
  condition: >
    sensitive_files and open_read
    and proc_name_exists
    and not proc.name in (user_mgmt_binaries, userexec_binaries, package_mgmt_binaries,
     cron_binaries, read_sensitive_file_binaries, shell_binaries, hids_binaries,
     vpn_binaries, mail_config_binaries, nomachine_binaries, sshkit_script_binaries,
     in.proftpd, mandb, salt-call, salt-minion, postgres_mgmt_binaries,
     google_oslogin_
     )
    and not cmp_cp_by_passwd
    and not ansible_running_python
    and not run_by_qualys
    and not run_by_chef
    and not run_by_google_accounts_daemon
    and not user_read_sensitive_file_conditions
    and not mandb_postinst
    and not perl_running_plesk
    and not perl_running_updmap
    and not veritas_driver_script
    and not perl_running_centrifydc
    and not runuser_reading_pam
    and not linux_bench_reading_etc_shadow
    and not user_known_read_sensitive_files_activities
    and not user_read_sensitive_file_containers    
  output: >
    Sensitive file opened for reading by non-trusted program (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid program=%proc.name
    command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid file=%fd.name parent=%proc.pname gparent=%proc.aname[2] ggparent=%proc.aname[3] gggparent=%proc.aname[4] container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)    
  priority: WARNING
  tags: [host, container, filesystem, mitre_credential_access, mitre_discovery, T1555, T1212, T1020, T1552, T1083]

- macro: amazon_linux_running_python_yum
  condition: >
    (proc.name = python and
     proc.pcmdline = "python -m amazon_linux_extras system_motd" and
     proc.cmdline startswith "python -c import yum;")    

- macro: user_known_write_rpm_database_activities
  condition: (never_true)

# Only let rpm-related programs write to the rpm database
- rule: Write below rpm database
  desc: an attempt to write to the rpm database by any non-rpm related program
  condition: >
    fd.name startswith /var/lib/rpm and open_write
    and not rpm_procs
    and not ansible_running_python
    and not python_running_chef
    and not exe_running_docker_save
    and not amazon_linux_running_python_yum
    and not user_known_write_rpm_database_activities    
  output: "Rpm database opened for writing by a non-rpm program (command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid file=%fd.name parent=%proc.pname pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)"
  priority: ERROR
  tags: [host, container, filesystem, software_mgmt, mitre_persistence, T1072]

- macro: postgres_running_wal_e
  condition: (proc.pname=postgres and (proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c envdir /etc/wal-e.d/env /usr/local/bin/wal-e" or proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c envdir \"/run/etc/wal-e.d/env\" wal-g wal-push"))

- macro: redis_running_prepost_scripts
  condition: (proc.aname[2]=redis-server and (proc.cmdline contains "redis-server.post-up.d" or proc.cmdline contains "redis-server.pre-up.d"))

- macro: rabbitmq_running_scripts
  condition: >
    (proc.pname=beam.smp and
    (proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c exec ps" or
     proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c exec inet_gethost" or
     proc.cmdline= "sh -s unix:cmd" or
     proc.cmdline= "sh -c exec /bin/sh -s unix:cmd 2>&1"))    

- macro: rabbitmqctl_running_scripts
  condition: (proc.aname[2]=rabbitmqctl and proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c ")

- macro: run_by_appdynamics
  condition: (proc.pname=java and proc.pcmdline startswith "java -jar -Dappdynamics")

- macro: user_known_db_spawned_processes
  condition: (never_true)

- rule: DB program spawned process
  desc: >
    a database-server related program spawned a new process other than itself.
    This shouldn\'t occur and is a follow on from some SQL injection attacks.    
  condition: >
    proc.pname in (db_server_binaries)
    and spawned_process
    and not proc.name in (db_server_binaries)
    and not postgres_running_wal_e
    and not user_known_db_spawned_processes    
  output: >
    Database-related program spawned process other than itself (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid
    program=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid parent=%proc.pname container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags)    
  priority: NOTICE
  tags: [host, container, process, database, mitre_execution, T1190]

- macro: user_known_modify_bin_dir_activities
  condition: (never_true)

- rule: Modify binary dirs
  desc: an attempt to modify any file below a set of binary directories.
  condition: bin_dir_rename and modify and not package_mgmt_procs and not exe_running_docker_save and not user_known_modify_bin_dir_activities
  output: >
    File below known binary directory renamed/removed (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid
    pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline operation=%evt.type file=%fd.name %evt.args container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)    
  priority: ERROR
  tags: [host, container, filesystem, mitre_persistence, T1222.002]

- macro: user_known_mkdir_bin_dir_activities
  condition: (never_true)

- rule: Mkdir binary dirs
  desc: an attempt to create a directory below a set of binary directories.
  condition: >
    mkdir
    and bin_dir_mkdir
    and not package_mgmt_procs
    and not user_known_mkdir_bin_dir_activities
    and not exe_running_docker_save    
  output: >
    Directory below known binary directory created (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid
    command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid directory=%evt.arg.path container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)    
  priority: ERROR
  tags: [host, container, filesystem, mitre_persistence, T1222.002]

# This list allows for easy additions to the set of commands allowed
# to change thread namespace without having to copy and override the
# entire change thread namespace rule.
- list: user_known_change_thread_namespace_binaries
  items: [crio, multus]

- macro: user_known_change_thread_namespace_activities
  condition: (never_true)

- list: network_plugin_binaries
  items: [aws-cni, azure-vnet]

- macro: weaveworks_scope
  condition: (container.image.repository endswith weaveworks/scope and proc.name=scope)

- rule: Change thread namespace
  desc: >
    an attempt to change a program/thread\'s namespace (commonly done
    as a part of creating a container) by calling setns.    
  condition: >
    evt.type=setns and evt.dir=<
    and proc_name_exists
    and not (container.id=host and proc.name in (docker_binaries, k8s_binaries, lxd_binaries, nsenter))
    and not proc.name in (sysdigcloud_binaries, sysdig, calico, oci-umount, cilium-cni, network_plugin_binaries)
    and not proc.name in (user_known_change_thread_namespace_binaries)
    and not proc.name startswith "runc"
    and not proc.cmdline startswith "containerd"
    and not proc.pname in (sysdigcloud_binaries, hyperkube, kubelet, protokube, dockerd, tini, aws)
    and not java_running_sdjagent
    and not kubelet_running_loopback
    and not rancher_agent
    and not rancher_network_manager
    and not calico_node
    and not weaveworks_scope
    and not user_known_change_thread_namespace_activities    
  enabled: false
  output: >
    Namespace change (setns) by unexpected program (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid
    parent=%proc.pname %container.info container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag)    
  priority: NOTICE
  tags: [host, container, process, mitre_privilege_escalation, mitre_lateral_movement, T1611]

# The binaries in this list and their descendents are *not* allowed
# spawn shells. This includes the binaries spawning shells directly as
# well as indirectly. For example, apache -> php/perl for
# mod_{php,perl} -> some shell is also not allowed, because the shell
# has apache as an ancestor.

- list: protected_shell_spawning_binaries
  items: [
    http_server_binaries, db_server_binaries, nosql_server_binaries, mail_binaries,
    fluentd, flanneld, splunkd, consul, smbd, runsv, PM2
    ]

- macro: parent_java_running_zookeeper
  condition: (proc.pname=java and proc.pcmdline contains org.apache.zookeeper.server)

- macro: parent_java_running_kafka
  condition: (proc.pname=java and proc.pcmdline contains kafka.Kafka)

- macro: parent_java_running_elasticsearch
  condition: (proc.pname=java and proc.pcmdline contains org.elasticsearch.bootstrap.Elasticsearch)

- macro: parent_java_running_activemq
  condition: (proc.pname=java and proc.pcmdline contains activemq.jar)

- macro: parent_java_running_cassandra
  condition: (proc.pname=java and (proc.pcmdline contains "-Dcassandra.config.loader" or proc.pcmdline contains org.apache.cassandra.service.CassandraDaemon))

- macro: parent_java_running_jboss_wildfly
  condition: (proc.pname=java and proc.pcmdline contains org.jboss)

- macro: parent_java_running_glassfish
  condition: (proc.pname=java and proc.pcmdline contains com.sun.enterprise.glassfish)

- macro: parent_java_running_hadoop
  condition: (proc.pname=java and proc.pcmdline contains org.apache.hadoop)

- macro: parent_java_running_datastax
  condition: (proc.pname=java and proc.pcmdline contains com.datastax)

- macro: nginx_starting_nginx
  condition: (proc.pname=nginx and proc.cmdline contains "/usr/sbin/nginx -c /etc/nginx/nginx.conf")

- macro: nginx_running_aws_s3_cp
  condition: (proc.pname=nginx and proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c /usr/local/bin/aws s3 cp")

- macro: consul_running_net_scripts
  condition: (proc.pname=consul and (proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c curl" or proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c nc"))

- macro: consul_running_alert_checks
  condition: (proc.pname=consul and proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c /bin/consul-alerts")

- macro: serf_script
  condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c serf")

- macro: check_process_status
  condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c kill -0 ")

# In some cases, you may want to consider node processes run directly
# in containers as protected shell spawners. Examples include using
# pm2-docker or pm2 start some-app.js --no-daemon-mode as the direct
# entrypoint of the container, and when the node app is a long-lived
# server using something like express.
#
# However, there are other uses of node related to build pipelines for
# which node is not really a server but instead a general scripting
# tool. In these cases, shells are very likely and in these cases you
# don't want to consider node processes protected shell spawners.
#
# We have to choose one of these cases, so we consider node processes
# as unprotected by default. If you want to consider any node process
# run in a container as a protected shell spawner, override the below
# macro to remove the "never_true" clause, which allows it to take effect.
- macro: possibly_node_in_container
  condition: (never_true and (proc.pname=node and proc.aname[3]=docker-containe))

# Similarly, you may want to consider any shell spawned by apache
# tomcat as suspect. The famous apache struts attack (CVE-2017-5638)
# could be exploited to do things like spawn shells.
#
# However, many applications *do* use tomcat to run arbitrary shells,
# as a part of build pipelines, etc.
#
# Like for node, we make this case opt-in.
- macro: possibly_parent_java_running_tomcat
  condition: (never_true and proc.pname=java and proc.pcmdline contains org.apache.catalina.startup.Bootstrap)

- macro: protected_shell_spawner
  condition: >
    (proc.aname in (protected_shell_spawning_binaries)
    or parent_java_running_zookeeper
    or parent_java_running_kafka
    or parent_java_running_elasticsearch
    or parent_java_running_activemq
    or parent_java_running_cassandra
    or parent_java_running_jboss_wildfly
    or parent_java_running_glassfish
    or parent_java_running_hadoop
    or parent_java_running_datastax
    or possibly_parent_java_running_tomcat
    or possibly_node_in_container)    

- list: mesos_shell_binaries
  items: [mesos-docker-ex, mesos-slave, mesos-health-ch]

# Note that runsv is both in protected_shell_spawner and the
# exclusions by pname. This means that runsv can itself spawn shells
# (the ./run and ./finish scripts), but the processes runsv can not
# spawn shells.
- rule: Run shell untrusted
  desc: an attempt to spawn a shell below a non-shell application. Specific applications are monitored.
  condition: >
    spawned_process
    and shell_procs
    and proc.pname exists
    and protected_shell_spawner
    and not proc.pname in (shell_binaries, gitlab_binaries, cron_binaries, user_known_shell_spawn_binaries,
                           needrestart_binaries,
                           mesos_shell_binaries,
                           erl_child_setup, exechealthz,
                           PM2, PassengerWatchd, c_rehash, svlogd, logrotate, hhvm, serf,
                           lb-controller, nvidia-installe, runsv, statsite, erlexec, calico-node,
                           "puma reactor")
    and not proc.cmdline in (known_shell_spawn_cmdlines)
    and not proc.aname in (unicorn_launche)
    and not consul_running_net_scripts
    and not consul_running_alert_checks
    and not nginx_starting_nginx
    and not nginx_running_aws_s3_cp
    and not run_by_package_mgmt_binaries
    and not serf_script
    and not check_process_status
    and not run_by_foreman
    and not python_mesos_marathon_scripting
    and not splunk_running_forwarder
    and not postgres_running_wal_e
    and not redis_running_prepost_scripts
    and not rabbitmq_running_scripts
    and not rabbitmqctl_running_scripts
    and not run_by_appdynamics
    and not user_shell_container_exclusions    
  output: >
    Shell spawned by untrusted binary (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid shell=%proc.name parent=%proc.pname
    cmdline=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline gparent=%proc.aname[2] ggparent=%proc.aname[3]
    aname[4]=%proc.aname[4] aname[5]=%proc.aname[5] aname[6]=%proc.aname[6] aname[7]=%proc.aname[7] container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags)    
  priority: DEBUG
  tags: [host, container, process, shell, mitre_execution, T1059.004]

- macro: allowed_openshift_registry_root
  condition: >
    (container.image.repository startswith openshift3/ or
     container.image.repository startswith registry.redhat.io/openshift3/ or
     container.image.repository startswith registry.access.redhat.com/openshift3/)    

# Source: https://docs.openshift.com/enterprise/3.2/install_config/install/disconnected_install.html
- macro: openshift_image
  condition: >
    (allowed_openshift_registry_root and
      (container.image.repository endswith /logging-deployment or
       container.image.repository endswith /logging-elasticsearch or
       container.image.repository endswith /logging-kibana or
       container.image.repository endswith /logging-fluentd or
       container.image.repository endswith /logging-auth-proxy or
       container.image.repository endswith /metrics-deployer or
       container.image.repository endswith /metrics-hawkular-metrics or
       container.image.repository endswith /metrics-cassandra or
       container.image.repository endswith /metrics-heapster or
       container.image.repository endswith /ose-haproxy-router or
       container.image.repository endswith /ose-deployer or
       container.image.repository endswith /ose-sti-builder or
       container.image.repository endswith /ose-docker-builder or
       container.image.repository endswith /ose-pod or
       container.image.repository endswith /ose-node or
       container.image.repository endswith /ose-docker-registry or
       container.image.repository endswith /prometheus-node-exporter or
       container.image.repository endswith /image-inspector))    

- list: redhat_io_images_privileged
  items: [registry.redhat.io/openshift-logging/fluentd-rhel8, registry.redhat.io/openshift4/ose-csi-node-driver-registrar, registry.redhat.io/openshift4/ose-kubernetes-nmstate-handler-rhel8, registry.redhat.io/openshift4/ose-local-storage-diskmaker]

- macro: redhat_image
  condition: >
    (container.image.repository in (redhat_io_images_privileged))    

# https://docs.aws.amazon.com/eks/latest/userguide/add-ons-images.html
#  official AWS EKS registry list. AWS has different ECR repo per region
- macro: allowed_aws_ecr_registry_root_for_eks
  condition: >
    (container.image.repository startswith "602401143452.dkr.ecr" or
     container.image.repository startswith "877085696533.dkr.ecr" or
     container.image.repository startswith "800184023465.dkr.ecr" or
     container.image.repository startswith "918309763551.dkr.ecr" or
     container.image.repository startswith "961992271922.dkr.ecr" or
     container.image.repository startswith "590381155156.dkr.ecr" or
     container.image.repository startswith "558608220178.dkr.ecr" or
     container.image.repository startswith "151742754352.dkr.ecr" or
     container.image.repository startswith "013241004608.dkr.ecr")    


- macro: aws_eks_core_images
  condition: >
    (allowed_aws_ecr_registry_root_for_eks and
    (container.image.repository endswith ".amazonaws.com/amazon-k8s-cni" or
     container.image.repository endswith ".amazonaws.com/eks/kube-proxy"))    


- macro: aws_eks_image_sensitive_mount
  condition: >
    (allowed_aws_ecr_registry_root_for_eks and container.image.repository endswith ".amazonaws.com/amazon-k8s-cni")    

# These images are allowed both to run with --privileged and to mount
# sensitive paths from the host filesystem.
#
# NOTE: This list is only provided for backwards compatibility with
# older local falco rules files that may have been appending to
# trusted_images. To make customizations, it's better to add images to
# either privileged_images or falco_sensitive_mount_images.
- list: trusted_images
  items: []

# Add conditions to this macro (probably in a separate file,
# overwriting this macro) to specify additional containers that are
# trusted and therefore allowed to run privileged *and* with sensitive
# mounts.
#
# Like trusted_images, this is deprecated in favor of
# user_privileged_containers and user_sensitive_mount_containers and
# is only provided for backwards compatibility.
#
# In this file, it just takes one of the images in trusted_containers
# and repeats it.
- macro: user_trusted_containers
  condition: (never_true)

- list: sematext_images
  items: [docker.io/sematext/sematext-agent-docker, docker.io/sematext/agent, docker.io/sematext/logagent,
          registry.access.redhat.com/sematext/sematext-agent-docker,
          registry.access.redhat.com/sematext/agent,
          registry.access.redhat.com/sematext/logagent]

# Falco containers
- list: falco_containers
  items:
    - falcosecurity/falco
    - docker.io/falcosecurity/falco
    - public.ecr.aws/falcosecurity/falco

# Falco no driver containers
- list: falco_no_driver_containers
  items:
    - falcosecurity/falco-no-driver
    - docker.io/falcosecurity/falco-no-driver
    - public.ecr.aws/falcosecurity/falco-no-driver

# These container images are allowed to run with --privileged and full set of capabilities
# TODO: Remove k8s.gcr.io reference after 01/Dec/2023
- list: falco_privileged_images
  items: [
    falco_containers,
    docker.io/calico/node,
    calico/node,
    docker.io/cloudnativelabs/kube-router,
    docker.io/docker/ucp-agent,
    docker.io/mesosphere/mesos-slave,
    docker.io/rook/toolbox,
    docker.io/sysdig/sysdig,
    gcr.io/google_containers/kube-proxy,
    gcr.io/google-containers/startup-script,
    gcr.io/projectcalico-org/node,
    gke.gcr.io/kube-proxy,
    gke.gcr.io/gke-metadata-server,
    gke.gcr.io/netd-amd64,
    gke.gcr.io/watcher-daemonset,
    gcr.io/google-containers/prometheus-to-sd,
    k8s.gcr.io/ip-masq-agent-amd64,
    k8s.gcr.io/kube-proxy,
    k8s.gcr.io/prometheus-to-sd,
    registry.k8s.io/ip-masq-agent-amd64,
    registry.k8s.io/kube-proxy,
    registry.k8s.io/prometheus-to-sd,
    quay.io/calico/node,
    sysdig/sysdig,
    sematext_images,
    k8s.gcr.io/dns/k8s-dns-node-cache,
    registry.k8s.io/dns/k8s-dns-node-cache,
    mcr.microsoft.com/oss/kubernetes/kube-proxy
  ]

- macro: falco_privileged_containers
  condition: (openshift_image or
              user_trusted_containers or
              aws_eks_core_images or
              container.image.repository in (trusted_images) or
              container.image.repository in (falco_privileged_images) or
              container.image.repository startswith istio/proxy_ or
              container.image.repository startswith quay.io/sysdig/)

# Add conditions to this macro (probably in a separate file,
# overwriting this macro) to specify additional containers that are
# allowed to run privileged
#
# In this file, it just takes one of the images in falco_privileged_images
# and repeats it.
- macro: user_privileged_containers
  condition: (never_true)

# These container images are allowed to mount sensitive paths from the
# host filesystem.
- list: falco_sensitive_mount_images
  items: [
    falco_containers,
    docker.io/sysdig/sysdig, sysdig/sysdig,
    gcr.io/google_containers/hyperkube,
    gcr.io/google_containers/kube-proxy, docker.io/calico/node,
    docker.io/rook/toolbox, docker.io/cloudnativelabs/kube-router, docker.io/consul,
    docker.io/datadog/docker-dd-agent, docker.io/datadog/agent, docker.io/docker/ucp-agent, docker.io/gliderlabs/logspout,
    docker.io/netdata/netdata, docker.io/google/cadvisor, docker.io/prom/node-exporter,
    amazon/amazon-ecs-agent, prom/node-exporter, amazon/cloudwatch-agent
    ]

- macro: falco_sensitive_mount_containers
  condition: (user_trusted_containers or
              aws_eks_image_sensitive_mount or
              container.image.repository in (trusted_images) or
              container.image.repository in (falco_sensitive_mount_images) or
              container.image.repository startswith quay.io/sysdig/ or
              container.image.repository=k8scloudprovider/cinder-csi-plugin)

# Add conditions to this macro (probably in a separate file,
# overwriting this macro) to specify additional containers that are
# allowed to perform sensitive mounts.
#
# In this file, it just takes one of the images in falco_sensitive_mount_images
# and repeats it.
- macro: user_sensitive_mount_containers
  condition: (never_true)

- rule: Launch Privileged Container
  desc: Detect the initial process started in a privileged container. Exceptions are made for known trusted images.
  condition: >
    container_started and container
    and container.privileged=true
    and not falco_privileged_containers
    and not user_privileged_containers
    and not redhat_image    
  output: Privileged container started (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid %container.info image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag)
  priority: INFO
  tags: [container, cis, mitre_privilege_escalation, mitre_lateral_movement, T1610]

# These capabilities were used in the past to escape from containers
- macro: excessively_capable_container
  condition: >
    (thread.cap_permitted contains CAP_SYS_ADMIN
    or thread.cap_permitted contains CAP_SYS_MODULE
    or thread.cap_permitted contains CAP_SYS_RAWIO
    or thread.cap_permitted contains CAP_SYS_PTRACE
    or thread.cap_permitted contains CAP_SYS_BOOT
    or thread.cap_permitted contains CAP_SYSLOG
    or thread.cap_permitted contains CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH
    or thread.cap_permitted contains CAP_NET_ADMIN
    or thread.cap_permitted contains CAP_BPF)    

- rule: Launch Excessively Capable Container
  desc: Detect container started with a powerful set of capabilities. Exceptions are made for known trusted images.
  condition: >
    container_started and container
    and excessively_capable_container
    and not falco_privileged_containers
    and not user_privileged_containers    
  output: Excessively capable container started (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid %container.info image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag cap_permitted=%thread.cap_permitted)
  priority: INFO
  tags: [container, cis, mitre_privilege_escalation, mitre_lateral_movement, T1610]


# For now, only considering a full mount of /etc as
# sensitive. Ideally, this would also consider all subdirectories
# below /etc as well, but the globbing mechanism
# doesn't allow exclusions of a full pattern, only single characters.
- macro: sensitive_mount
  condition: (container.mount.dest[/proc*] != "N/A" or
              container.mount.dest[/var/run/docker.sock] != "N/A" or
              container.mount.dest[/var/run/crio/crio.sock] != "N/A" or
              container.mount.dest[/run/containerd/containerd.sock] != "N/A" or
              container.mount.dest[/var/lib/kubelet] != "N/A" or
              container.mount.dest[/var/lib/kubelet/pki] != "N/A" or
              container.mount.dest[/] != "N/A" or
              container.mount.dest[/home/admin] != "N/A" or
              container.mount.dest[/etc] != "N/A" or
              container.mount.dest[/etc/kubernetes] != "N/A" or
              container.mount.dest[/etc/kubernetes/manifests] != "N/A" or
              container.mount.dest[/root*] != "N/A")

# The steps libcontainer performs to set up the root program for a container are:
# - clone + exec self to a program runc:[0:PARENT]
# - clone a program runc:[1:CHILD] which sets up all the namespaces
# - clone a second program runc:[2:INIT] + exec to the root program.
#   The parent of runc:[2:INIT] is runc:0:PARENT]
# As soon as 1:CHILD is created, 0:PARENT exits, so there's a race
#   where at the time 2:INIT execs the root program, 0:PARENT might have
#   already exited, or might still be around. So we handle both.
# We also let runc:[1:CHILD] count as the parent process, which can occur
# when we lose events and lose track of state.

- macro: container_entrypoint
  condition: (not proc.pname exists or proc.pname in (runc:[0:PARENT], runc:[1:CHILD], runc, docker-runc, exe, docker-runc-cur))

- rule: Launch Sensitive Mount Container
  desc: >
    Detect the initial process started by a container that has a mount from a sensitive host directory
    (i.e. /proc). Exceptions are made for known trusted images.    
  condition: >
    container_started and container
    and sensitive_mount
    and not falco_sensitive_mount_containers
    and not user_sensitive_mount_containers    
  output: Container with sensitive mount started (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid %container.info image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag mounts=%container.mounts)
  priority: INFO
  tags: [container, cis, mitre_lateral_movement, T1610]

# In a local/user rules file, you could override this macro to
# explicitly enumerate the container images that you want to run in
# your environment. In this main falco rules file, there isn't any way
# to know all the containers that can run, so any container is
# allowed, by using a filter that is guaranteed to evaluate to true.
# In the overridden macro, the condition would look something like
# (container.image.repository = vendor/container-1 or
# container.image.repository = vendor/container-2 or ...)
- macro: allowed_containers
  condition: (container.id exists)

- rule: Launch Disallowed Container
  desc: >
    Detect the initial process started by a container that is not in a list of allowed containers.    
  condition: container_started and container and not allowed_containers
  output: Container started and not in allowed list (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid %container.info image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag)
  priority: WARNING
  tags: [container, mitre_lateral_movement, T1610]

- macro: user_known_system_user_login
  condition: (never_true)

# Anything run interactively by root
# - condition: evt.type != switch and user.name = root and proc.name != sshd and interactive
#  output: "Interactive root (%user.name %proc.name %evt.dir %evt.type %evt.args %fd.name)"
#  priority: WARNING

- rule: System user interactive
  desc: an attempt to run interactive commands by a system (i.e. non-login) user
  condition: spawned_process and system_users and interactive and not user_known_system_user_login
  output: "System user ran an interactive command (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags)"
  priority: INFO
  tags: [host, container, users, mitre_execution, T1059]

# In some cases, a shell is expected to be run in a container. For example, configuration
# management software may do this, which is expected.
- macro: user_expected_terminal_shell_in_container_conditions
  condition: (never_true)

- rule: Terminal shell in container
  desc: A shell was used as the entrypoint/exec point into a container with an attached terminal.
  condition: >
    spawned_process and container
    and shell_procs and proc.tty != 0
    and container_entrypoint
    and not user_expected_terminal_shell_in_container_conditions    
  output: >
    A shell was spawned in a container with an attached terminal (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid %container.info
    shell=%proc.name parent=%proc.pname cmdline=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid terminal=%proc.tty container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags)    
  priority: NOTICE
  tags: [container, shell, mitre_execution, T1059]

# For some container types (mesos), there isn't a container image to
# work with, and the container name is autogenerated, so there isn't
# any stable aspect of the software to work with. In this case, we
# fall back to allowing certain command lines.

- list: known_shell_spawn_cmdlines
  items: [
    '"sh -c uname -p 2> /dev/null"',
    '"sh -c uname -s 2>&1"',
    '"sh -c uname -r 2>&1"',
    '"sh -c uname -v 2>&1"',
    '"sh -c uname -a 2>&1"',
    '"sh -c ruby -v 2>&1"',
    '"sh -c getconf CLK_TCK"',
    '"sh -c getconf PAGESIZE"',
    '"sh -c LC_ALL=C LANG=C /sbin/ldconfig -p 2>/dev/null"',
    '"sh -c LANG=C /sbin/ldconfig -p 2>/dev/null"',
    '"sh -c /sbin/ldconfig -p 2>/dev/null"',
    '"sh -c stty -a 2>/dev/null"',
    '"sh -c stty -a < /dev/tty"',
    '"sh -c stty -g < /dev/tty"',
    '"sh -c node index.js"',
    '"sh -c node index"',
    '"sh -c node ./src/start.js"',
    '"sh -c node app.js"',
    '"sh -c node -e \"require(''nan'')\""',
    '"sh -c node -e \"require(''nan'')\")"',
    '"sh -c node $NODE_DEBUG_OPTION index.js "',
    '"sh -c crontab -l 2"',
    '"sh -c lsb_release -a"',
    '"sh -c lsb_release -is 2>/dev/null"',
    '"sh -c whoami"',
    '"sh -c node_modules/.bin/bower-installer"',
    '"sh -c /bin/hostname -f 2> /dev/null"',
    '"sh -c locale -a"',
    '"sh -c  -t -i"',
    '"sh -c openssl version"',
    '"bash -c id -Gn kafadmin"',
    '"sh -c /bin/sh -c ''date +%%s''"',
    '"sh -c /usr/share/lighttpd/create-mime.conf.pl"'
    ]

# This list allows for easy additions to the set of commands allowed
# to run shells in containers without having to without having to copy
# and override the entire run shell in container macro. Once
# https://github.com/falcosecurity/falco/issues/255 is fixed this will be a
# bit easier, as someone could append of any of the existing lists.
- list: user_known_shell_spawn_binaries
  items: []

# This macro allows for easy additions to the set of commands allowed
# to run shells in containers without having to override the entire
# rule. Its default value is an expression that always is false, which
# becomes true when the "not ..." in the rule is applied.
- macro: user_shell_container_exclusions
  condition: (never_true)

- macro: login_doing_dns_lookup
  condition: (proc.name=login and fd.l4proto=udp and fd.sport=53)

# sockfamily ip is to exclude certain processes (like 'groups') that communicate on unix-domain sockets
# systemd can listen on ports to launch things like sshd on demand
- rule: System procs network activity
  desc: any network activity performed by system binaries that are not expected to send or receive any network traffic
  condition: >
    (fd.sockfamily = ip and (system_procs or proc.name in (shell_binaries)))
    and (inbound_outbound)
    and not proc.name in (known_system_procs_network_activity_binaries)
    and not login_doing_dns_lookup
    and not user_expected_system_procs_network_activity_conditions    
  output: >
    Known system binary sent/received network traffic
    (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid connection=%fd.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)    
  priority: NOTICE
  tags: [host, container, network, mitre_exfiltration, T1059, TA0011]

# This list allows easily whitelisting system proc names that are
# expected to communicate on the network.
- list: known_system_procs_network_activity_binaries
  items: [systemd, hostid, id]

# This macro allows specifying conditions under which a system binary
# is allowed to communicate on the network. For instance, only specific
# proc.cmdline values could be allowed to be more granular in what is
# allowed.
- macro: user_expected_system_procs_network_activity_conditions
  condition: (never_true)

# When filled in, this should look something like:
# (proc.env contains "HTTP_PROXY=http://my.http.proxy.com ")
# The trailing space is intentional so avoid matching on prefixes of
# the actual proxy.
- macro: allowed_ssh_proxy_env
  condition: (always_true)

- list: http_proxy_binaries
  items: [curl, wget]

- macro: http_proxy_procs
  condition: (proc.name in (http_proxy_binaries))

- rule: Program run with disallowed http proxy env
  desc: An attempt to run a program with a disallowed HTTP_PROXY environment variable
  condition: >
    spawned_process and
    http_proxy_procs and
    not allowed_ssh_proxy_env and
    proc.env icontains HTTP_PROXY    
  enabled: false
  output: >
    Program run with disallowed HTTP_PROXY environment variable
    (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid env=%proc.env parent=%proc.pname container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags)    
  priority: NOTICE
  tags: [host, container, users, mitre_command_and_control, T1090, T1204]

# In some environments, any attempt by a interpreted program (perl,
# python, ruby, etc) to listen for incoming connections or perform
# outgoing connections might be suspicious. These rules are not
# enabled by default.

- rule: Interpreted procs inbound network activity
  desc: Any inbound network activity performed by any interpreted program (perl, python, ruby, etc.)
  condition: >
    (inbound and interpreted_procs)    
  enabled: false
  output: >
    Interpreted program received/listened for network traffic
    (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid connection=%fd.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)    
  priority: NOTICE
  tags: [host, container, network, mitre_exfiltration, TA0011]

- rule: Interpreted procs outbound network activity
  desc: Any outbound network activity performed by any interpreted program (perl, python, ruby, etc.)
  condition: >
    (outbound and interpreted_procs)    
  enabled: false
  output: >
    Interpreted program performed outgoing network connection
    (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid connection=%fd.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)    
  priority: NOTICE
  tags: [host, container, network, mitre_exfiltration, TA0011]

- list: openvpn_udp_ports
  items: [1194, 1197, 1198, 8080, 9201]

- list: l2tp_udp_ports
  items: [500, 1701, 4500, 10000]

- list: statsd_ports
  items: [8125]

- list: ntp_ports
  items: [123]

# Some applications will connect a udp socket to an address only to
# test connectivity. Assuming the udp connect works, they will follow
# up with a tcp connect that actually sends/receives data.
#
# With that in mind, we listed a few commonly seen ports here to avoid
# some false positives. In addition, we make the main rule opt-in, so
# it's disabled by default.

- list: test_connect_ports
  items: [0, 9, 80, 3306]

- list: expected_udp_ports
  items: [53, openvpn_udp_ports, l2tp_udp_ports, statsd_ports, ntp_ports, test_connect_ports]

- macro: expected_udp_traffic
  condition: fd.port in (expected_udp_ports)

- rule: Unexpected UDP Traffic
  desc: UDP traffic not on port 53 (DNS) or other commonly used ports
  condition: (inbound_outbound) and fd.l4proto=udp and not expected_udp_traffic
  enabled: false
  output: >
    Unexpected UDP Traffic Seen
    (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid connection=%fd.name proto=%fd.l4proto evt=%evt.type %evt.args container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)    
  priority: NOTICE
  tags: [host, container, network, mitre_exfiltration, TA0011]

# With the current restriction on system calls handled by falco
# (e.g. excluding read/write/sendto/recvfrom/etc, this rule won't
# trigger).
# - rule: Ssh error in syslog
#   desc: any ssh errors (failed logins, disconnects, ...) sent to syslog
#   condition: syslog and ssh_error_message and evt.dir = <
#   output: "sshd sent error message to syslog (error=%evt.buffer)"
#   priority: WARNING

- macro: somebody_becoming_themselves
  condition: ((user.name=nobody and evt.arg.uid=nobody) or
              (user.name=www-data and evt.arg.uid=www-data) or
              (user.name=_apt and evt.arg.uid=_apt) or
              (user.name=postfix and evt.arg.uid=postfix) or
              (user.name=pki-agent and evt.arg.uid=pki-agent) or
              (user.name=pki-acme and evt.arg.uid=pki-acme) or
              (user.name=nfsnobody and evt.arg.uid=nfsnobody) or
              (user.name=postgres and evt.arg.uid=postgres))

- macro: nrpe_becoming_nagios
  condition: (proc.name=nrpe and evt.arg.uid=nagios)

# In containers, the user name might be for a uid that exists in the
# container but not on the host. (See
# https://github.com/draios/sysdig/issues/954). So in that case, allow
# a setuid.
- macro: known_user_in_container
  condition: (container and user.name != "N/A")

# Add conditions to this macro (probably in a separate file,
# overwriting this macro) to allow for specific combinations of
# programs changing users by calling setuid.
#
# In this file, it just takes one of the condition in the base macro
# and repeats it.
- macro: user_known_non_sudo_setuid_conditions
  condition: user.name=root

# sshd, mail programs attempt to setuid to root even when running as non-root. Excluding here to avoid meaningless FPs
- rule: Non sudo setuid
  desc: >
    an attempt to change users by calling setuid. sudo/su are excluded. users "root" and "nobody"
    suing to itself are also excluded, as setuid calls typically involve dropping privileges.    
  condition: >
    evt.type=setuid and evt.dir=>
    and (known_user_in_container or not container)
    and not (user.name=root or user.uid=0)
    and not somebody_becoming_themselves
    and not proc.name in (known_setuid_binaries, userexec_binaries, mail_binaries, docker_binaries,
                          nomachine_binaries)
    and not proc.name startswith "runc:"
    and not java_running_sdjagent
    and not nrpe_becoming_nagios
    and not user_known_non_sudo_setuid_conditions    
  output: >
    Unexpected setuid call by non-sudo, non-root program (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid cur_uid=%user.uid parent=%proc.pname
    command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid uid=%evt.arg.uid container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)    
  priority: NOTICE
  tags: [host, container, users, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1548.001]

- macro: user_known_user_management_activities
  condition: (never_true)

- macro: chage_list
  condition: (proc.name=chage and (proc.cmdline contains "-l" or proc.cmdline contains "--list"))

- rule: User mgmt binaries
  desc: >
    activity by any programs that can manage users, passwords, or permissions. sudo and su are excluded.
    Activity in containers is also excluded--some containers create custom users on top
    of a base linux distribution at startup.
    Some innocuous command lines that don't actually change anything are excluded.    
  condition: >
    spawned_process and proc.name in (user_mgmt_binaries) and
    not proc.name in (su, sudo, lastlog, nologin, unix_chkpwd) and not container and
    not proc.pname in (cron_binaries, systemd, systemd.postins, udev.postinst, run-parts) and
    not proc.cmdline startswith "passwd -S" and
    not proc.cmdline startswith "useradd -D" and
    not proc.cmdline startswith "systemd --version" and
    not run_by_qualys and
    not run_by_sumologic_securefiles and
    not run_by_yum and
    not run_by_ms_oms and
    not run_by_google_accounts_daemon and
    not chage_list and
    not user_known_user_management_activities    
  output: >
    User management binary command run outside of container
    (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid parent=%proc.pname gparent=%proc.aname[2] ggparent=%proc.aname[3] gggparent=%proc.aname[4] exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags)    
  priority: NOTICE
  tags: [host, container, users, software_mgmt, mitre_persistence, T1543, T1098]

- list: allowed_dev_files
  items: [
    /dev/null, /dev/stdin, /dev/stdout, /dev/stderr,
    /dev/random, /dev/urandom, /dev/console, /dev/kmsg
    ]

- macro: user_known_create_files_below_dev_activities
  condition: (never_true)

# (we may need to add additional checks against false positives, see:
# https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/rkhunter/+bug/86153)
- rule: Create files below dev
  desc: creating any files below /dev other than known programs that manage devices. Some rootkits hide files in /dev.
  condition: >
    fd.directory = /dev and
    (evt.type = creat or (evt.type in (open,openat,openat2) and evt.arg.flags contains O_CREAT))
    and not proc.name in (dev_creation_binaries)
    and not fd.name in (allowed_dev_files)
    and not fd.name startswith /dev/tty
    and not user_known_create_files_below_dev_activities    
  output: "File created below /dev by untrusted program (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid file=%fd.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)"
  priority: ERROR
  tags: [host, container, filesystem, mitre_persistence, T1543, T1083]


# In a local/user rules file, you could override this macro to
# explicitly enumerate the container images that you want to allow
# access to EC2 metadata. In this main falco rules file, there isn't
# any way to know all the containers that should have access, so any
# container is allowed, by repeating the "container" macro. In the
# overridden macro, the condition would look something like
# (container.image.repository = vendor/container-1 or
# container.image.repository = vendor/container-2 or ...)
- macro: ec2_metadata_containers
  condition: container

# On EC2 instances, 169.254.169.254 is a special IP used to fetch
# metadata about the instance. It may be desirable to prevent access
# to this IP from containers.
- rule: Contact EC2 Instance Metadata Service From Container
  desc: Detect attempts to contact the EC2 Instance Metadata Service from a container
  condition: outbound and fd.sip="169.254.169.254" and container and not ec2_metadata_containers
  output: Outbound connection to EC2 instance metadata service (command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid connection=%fd.name %container.info image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag)
  priority: NOTICE
  enabled: false
  tags: [network, aws, container, mitre_discovery, T1565]


# This rule is not enabled by default, since this rule is for cloud environment(GCP, AWS and Azure) only.
# You can filter the container that you want to allow access to metadata by overwriting user_known_metadata_access macro.

- macro: user_known_metadata_access
  condition: (k8s.ns.name = "kube-system")

# On GCP, AWS and Azure, 169.254.169.254 is a special IP used to fetch
# metadata about the instance. The metadata could be used to get credentials by attackers.
- rule: Contact cloud metadata service from container
  desc: Detect attempts to contact the Cloud Instance Metadata Service from a container
  condition: outbound and fd.sip="169.254.169.254" and container and not user_known_metadata_access
  enabled: false
  output: Outbound connection to cloud instance metadata service (command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid connection=%fd.name %container.info image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag)
  priority: NOTICE
  tags: [network, container, mitre_discovery, T1565]

# Containers from IBM Cloud
- list: ibm_cloud_containers
  items:
    - icr.io/ext/sysdig/agent
    - registry.ng.bluemix.net/armada-master/metrics-server-amd64
    - registry.ng.bluemix.net/armada-master/olm

# In a local/user rules file, list the namespace or container images that are
# allowed to contact the K8s API Server from within a container. This
# might cover cases where the K8s infrastructure itself is running
# within a container.
# TODO: Remove k8s.gcr.io reference after 01/Dec/2023
- macro: k8s_containers
  condition: >
    (container.image.repository in (gcr.io/google_containers/hyperkube-amd64,
     gcr.io/google_containers/kube2sky,
     docker.io/sysdig/sysdig, sysdig/sysdig,
     fluent/fluentd-kubernetes-daemonset, prom/prometheus,
     falco_containers,
     falco_no_driver_containers,
     ibm_cloud_containers,
     velero/velero,
     quay.io/jetstack/cert-manager-cainjector, weaveworks/kured,
     quay.io/prometheus-operator/prometheus-operator, k8s.gcr.io/ingress-nginx/kube-webhook-certgen,
     registry.k8s.io/ingress-nginx/kube-webhook-certgen, quay.io/spotahome/redis-operator,
     registry.opensource.zalan.do/acid/postgres-operator, registry.opensource.zalan.do/acid/postgres-operator-ui,
     rabbitmqoperator/cluster-operator, quay.io/kubecost1/kubecost-cost-model,
     docker.io/bitnami/prometheus, docker.io/bitnami/kube-state-metrics, mcr.microsoft.com/oss/azure/aad-pod-identity/nmi)
     or (k8s.ns.name = "kube-system"))    

- macro: k8s_api_server
  condition: (fd.sip.name="kubernetes.default.svc.cluster.local")

- macro: user_known_contact_k8s_api_server_activities
  condition: (never_true)

- rule: Contact K8S API Server From Container
  desc: Detect attempts to contact the K8S API Server from a container
  condition: >
    evt.type=connect and evt.dir=< and
    (fd.typechar=4 or fd.typechar=6) and
    container and
    not k8s_containers and
    k8s_api_server and
    not user_known_contact_k8s_api_server_activities    
  output: Unexpected connection to K8s API Server from container (command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid %container.info image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag connection=%fd.name)
  priority: NOTICE
  tags: [network, k8s, container, mitre_discovery, T1565]

# In a local/user rules file, list the container images that are
# allowed to contact NodePort services from within a container. This
# might cover cases where the K8s infrastructure itself is running
# within a container.
#
# By default, all containers are allowed to contact NodePort services.
- macro: nodeport_containers
  condition: container

- rule: Unexpected K8s NodePort Connection
  desc: Detect attempts to use K8s NodePorts from a container
  condition: (inbound_outbound) and fd.sport >= 30000 and fd.sport <= 32767 and container and not nodeport_containers
  output: Unexpected K8s NodePort Connection (command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid connection=%fd.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
  priority: NOTICE
  tags: [network, k8s, container, mitre_persistence, T1205.001]

- list: network_tool_binaries
  items: [nc, ncat, netcat, nmap, dig, tcpdump, tshark, ngrep, telnet, mitmproxy, socat, zmap]

- macro: network_tool_procs
  condition: (proc.name in (network_tool_binaries))

# In a local/user rules file, create a condition that matches legitimate uses
# of a package management process inside a container.
#
# For example:
# - macro: user_known_package_manager_in_container
#   condition: proc.cmdline="dpkg -l"
- macro: user_known_package_manager_in_container
  condition: (never_true)

# Container is supposed to be immutable. Package management should be done in building the image.
# TODO: Remove k8s.gcr.io reference after 01/Dec/2023
- macro: pkg_mgmt_in_kube_proxy
  condition: >
    proc.cmdline startswith "update-alternat"
    and (container.image.repository = "registry.k8s.io/kube-proxy"
    or container.image.repository = "k8s.gcr.io/kube-proxy")    

- rule: Launch Package Management Process in Container
  desc: Package management process ran inside container
  condition: >
    spawned_process
    and container
    and user.name != "_apt"
    and package_mgmt_procs
    and not package_mgmt_ancestor_procs
    and not user_known_package_manager_in_container
    and not pkg_mgmt_in_kube_proxy    
  output: >
    Package management process launched in container (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid
    command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid container_id=%container.id container_name=%container.name image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags)    
  priority: ERROR
  tags: [container, process, software_mgmt, mitre_persistence, T1505]

- rule: Netcat Remote Code Execution in Container
  desc: Netcat Program runs inside container that allows remote code execution
  condition: >
    spawned_process and container and
    ((proc.name = "nc" and (proc.args contains "-e" or proc.args contains "-c")) or
     (proc.name = "ncat" and (proc.args contains "--sh-exec" or proc.args contains "--exec" or proc.args contains "-e "
                              or proc.args contains "-c " or proc.args contains "--lua-exec"))
    )    
  output: >
    Netcat runs inside container that allows remote code execution (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid
    command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid container_id=%container.id container_name=%container.name image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags)    
  priority: WARNING
  tags: [container, network, process, mitre_execution, T1059]

- macro: user_known_network_tool_activities
  condition: (never_true)

- rule: Launch Suspicious Network Tool in Container
  desc: Detect network tools launched inside container
  condition: >
    spawned_process and container and network_tool_procs and not user_known_network_tool_activities    
  output: >
    Network tool launched in container (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid parent_process=%proc.pname
    container_id=%container.id container_name=%container.name image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags)    
  priority: NOTICE
  tags: [container, network, process, mitre_discovery, mitre_exfiltration, T1595, T1046]

# This rule is not enabled by default, as there are legitimate use
# cases for these tools on hosts. If you want to enable it, modify the
# following macro.
- macro: consider_network_tools_on_host
  condition: (never_true)

- rule: Launch Suspicious Network Tool on Host
  desc: Detect network tools launched on the host
  condition: >
    spawned_process and
    not container and
    consider_network_tools_on_host and
    network_tool_procs and
    not user_known_network_tool_activities    
  output: >
    Network tool launched on host (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid parent_process=%proc.pname exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags)    
  priority: NOTICE
  tags: [host, network, process, mitre_discovery, mitre_exfiltration, T1595, T1046]

- list: grep_binaries
  items: [grep, egrep, fgrep]

- macro: grep_commands
  condition: (proc.name in (grep_binaries))

# a less restrictive search for things that might be passwords/ssh/user etc.
- macro: grep_more
  condition: (never_true)

- macro: private_key_or_password
  condition: >
    (proc.args icontains "BEGIN PRIVATE" or
     proc.args icontains "BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE" or
     proc.args icontains "BEGIN RSA PRIVATE" or
     proc.args icontains "BEGIN DSA PRIVATE" or
     proc.args icontains "BEGIN EC PRIVATE" or
     (grep_more and
      (proc.args icontains " pass " or
       proc.args icontains " ssh " or
       proc.args icontains " user "))
    )    

- rule: Search Private Keys or Passwords
  desc: >
    Detect grep private keys or passwords activity.    
  condition: >
    (spawned_process and
     ((grep_commands and private_key_or_password) or
      (proc.name = "find" and
        (proc.args contains "id_rsa" or 
         proc.args contains "id_dsa" or 
         proc.args contains "id_ed25519" or 
         proc.args contains "id_ecdsa"
        )
      ))
    )    
  output: >
    Grep private keys or passwords activities found
    (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid container_id=%container.id container_name=%container.name
    image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags)    
  priority:
    WARNING
  tags: [host, container, process, filesystem, mitre_credential_access, T1552.001]

- list: log_directories
  items: [/var/log, /dev/log]

- list: log_files
  items: [syslog, auth.log, secure, kern.log, cron, user.log, dpkg.log, last.log, yum.log, access_log, mysql.log, mysqld.log]

- macro: access_log_files
  condition: (fd.directory in (log_directories) or fd.filename in (log_files))

# a placeholder for whitelist log files that could be cleared. Recommend the macro as (fd.name startswith "/var/log/app1*")
- macro: allowed_clear_log_files
  condition: (never_true)

- macro: trusted_logging_images
  condition: (container.image.repository endswith "splunk/fluentd-hec" or
              container.image.repository endswith "fluent/fluentd-kubernetes-daemonset" or
              container.image.repository endswith "openshift3/ose-logging-fluentd" or
              container.image.repository endswith "containernetworking/azure-npm")

- rule: Clear Log Activities
  desc: Detect clearing of critical log files
  condition: >
    open_write and
    access_log_files and
    evt.arg.flags contains "O_TRUNC" and
    not trusted_logging_images and
    not allowed_clear_log_files    
  output: >
    Log files were tampered (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid file=%fd.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)    
  priority:
    WARNING
  tags: [host, container, filesystem, mitre_defense_evasion, T1070]

- list: data_remove_commands
  items: [shred, mkfs, mke2fs]

- macro: clear_data_procs
  condition: (proc.name in (data_remove_commands))

- macro: user_known_remove_data_activities
  condition: (never_true)

- rule: Remove Bulk Data from Disk
  desc: Detect process running to clear bulk data from disk
  condition: spawned_process and clear_data_procs and not user_known_remove_data_activities
  output: >
    Bulk data has been removed from disk (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid file=%fd.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags)    
  priority:
    WARNING
  tags: [host, container, process, filesystem, mitre_persistence, T1485]

# here `ash_history` will match both `bash_history` and `ash_history`
- macro: modify_shell_history
  condition: >
    (modify and (
      evt.arg.name endswith "ash_history" or
      evt.arg.name endswith "zsh_history" or
      evt.arg.name contains "fish_read_history" or
      evt.arg.name endswith "fish_history" or
      evt.arg.oldpath endswith "ash_history" or
      evt.arg.oldpath endswith "zsh_history" or
      evt.arg.oldpath contains "fish_read_history" or
      evt.arg.oldpath endswith "fish_history" or
      evt.arg.path endswith "ash_history" or
      evt.arg.path endswith "zsh_history" or
      evt.arg.path contains "fish_read_history" or
      evt.arg.path endswith "fish_history"))    

# here `ash_history` will match both `bash_history` and `ash_history`
- macro: truncate_shell_history
  condition: >
    (open_write and (
      fd.name endswith "ash_history" or
      fd.name endswith "zsh_history" or
      fd.name contains "fish_read_history" or
      fd.name endswith "fish_history") and evt.arg.flags contains "O_TRUNC")    

- macro: var_lib_docker_filepath
  condition: (evt.arg.name startswith /var/lib/docker or fd.name startswith /var/lib/docker)

- rule: Delete or rename shell history
  desc: Detect shell history deletion
  condition: >
    (modify_shell_history or truncate_shell_history) and
       not var_lib_docker_filepath and
       not proc.name in (docker_binaries)    
  output: >
    Shell history had been deleted or renamed (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid type=%evt.type command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid fd.name=%fd.name name=%evt.arg.name path=%evt.arg.path oldpath=%evt.arg.oldpath %container.info)    
  priority:
    WARNING
  tags: [host, container, process, filesystem, mitre_defense_evasion, T1070]

# This rule is deprecated and will/should never be triggered. Keep it here for backport compatibility.
# Rule Delete or rename shell history is the preferred rule to use now.
- rule: Delete Bash History
  desc: Detect bash history deletion
  condition: >
    ((spawned_process and proc.name in (shred, rm, mv) and proc.args contains "bash_history") or
     (open_write and fd.name contains "bash_history" and evt.arg.flags contains "O_TRUNC"))    
  output: >
    Shell history had been deleted or renamed (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid type=%evt.type command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid fd.name=%fd.name name=%evt.arg.name path=%evt.arg.path oldpath=%evt.arg.oldpath exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info)    
  priority:
    WARNING
  tags: [host, container, process, filesystem, mitre_defense_evasion, T1070]

- list: user_known_chmod_applications
  items: [hyperkube, kubelet, k3s-agent]

# This macro should be overridden in user rules as needed. This is useful if a given application
# should not be ignored altogether with the user_known_chmod_applications list, but only in
# specific conditions.
- macro: user_known_set_setuid_or_setgid_bit_conditions
  condition: (never_true)

- rule: Set Setuid or Setgid bit
  desc: >
    When the setuid or setgid bits are set for an application,
    this means that the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively.
    Detect setuid or setgid bits set via chmod    
  condition: >
    chmod and (evt.arg.mode contains "S_ISUID" or evt.arg.mode contains "S_ISGID")
    and not proc.name in (user_known_chmod_applications)
    and not exe_running_docker_save
    and not user_known_set_setuid_or_setgid_bit_conditions    
  enabled: false
  output: >
    Setuid or setgid bit is set via chmod (fd=%evt.arg.fd filename=%evt.arg.filename mode=%evt.arg.mode user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name
    command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid container_id=%container.id container_name=%container.name image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag)    
  priority:
    NOTICE
  tags: [host, container, process, users, mitre_persistence, T1548.001]

- list: exclude_hidden_directories
  items: [/root/.cassandra]

# The rule is disabled by default.
- macro: user_known_create_hidden_file_activities
  condition: (never_true)

- rule: Create Hidden Files or Directories
  desc: Detect hidden files or directories created
  condition: >
    ((modify and evt.arg.newpath contains "/.") or
     (mkdir and evt.arg.path contains "/.") or
     (open_write and evt.arg.flags contains "O_CREAT" and fd.name contains "/." and not fd.name pmatch (exclude_hidden_directories))) and
    not user_known_create_hidden_file_activities
    and not exe_running_docker_save    
  enabled: false
  output: >
    Hidden file or directory created (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid
    file=%fd.name newpath=%evt.arg.newpath container_id=%container.id container_name=%container.name image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag)    
  priority:
    NOTICE
  tags: [host, container, filesystem, mitre_persistence, T1564.001]

- list: remote_file_copy_binaries
  items: [rsync, scp, sftp, dcp]

- macro: remote_file_copy_procs
  condition: (proc.name in (remote_file_copy_binaries))

# Users should overwrite this macro to specify conditions under which a
# Custom condition for use of remote file copy tool in container
- macro: user_known_remote_file_copy_activities
  condition: (never_true)

- rule: Launch Remote File Copy Tools in Container
  desc: Detect remote file copy tools launched in container
  condition: >
    spawned_process
    and container
    and remote_file_copy_procs
    and not user_known_remote_file_copy_activities    
  output: >
    Remote file copy tool launched in container (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid parent_process=%proc.pname
    container_id=%container.id container_name=%container.name image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags)    
  priority: NOTICE
  tags: [container, network, process, mitre_lateral_movement, mitre_exfiltration, T1020, T1210]

- rule: Create Symlink Over Sensitive Files
  desc: Detect symlink created over sensitive files
  condition: >
    create_symlink and
    (evt.arg.target in (sensitive_file_names) or evt.arg.target in (sensitive_directory_names))    
  output: >
    Symlinks created over sensitive files (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid target=%evt.arg.target linkpath=%evt.arg.linkpath parent_process=%proc.pname)    
  priority: WARNING
  tags: [host, container, filesystem, mitre_exfiltration, mitre_credential_access, T1020, T1083, T1212, T1552, T1555]

- rule: Create Hardlink Over Sensitive Files
  desc: Detect hardlink created over sensitive files
  condition: >
    create_hardlink and
    (evt.arg.oldpath in (sensitive_file_names))    
  output: >
    Hardlinks created over sensitive files (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid target=%evt.arg.oldpath linkpath=%evt.arg.newpath parent_process=%proc.pname)    
  priority: WARNING
  tags: [host, container, filesystem, mitre_exfiltration, mitre_credential_access, T1020, T1083, T1212, T1552, T1555]

- list: miner_ports
  items: [
        25, 3333, 3334, 3335, 3336, 3357, 4444,
        5555, 5556, 5588, 5730, 6099, 6666, 7777,
        7778, 8000, 8001, 8008, 8080, 8118, 8333,
        8888, 8899, 9332, 9999, 14433, 14444,
        45560, 45700
    ]

- list: miner_domains
  items: [
      "asia1.ethpool.org","ca.minexmr.com",
      "cn.stratum.slushpool.com","de.minexmr.com",
      "eth-ar.dwarfpool.com","eth-asia.dwarfpool.com",
      "eth-asia1.nanopool.org","eth-au.dwarfpool.com",
      "eth-au1.nanopool.org","eth-br.dwarfpool.com",
      "eth-cn.dwarfpool.com","eth-cn2.dwarfpool.com",
      "eth-eu.dwarfpool.com","eth-eu1.nanopool.org",
      "eth-eu2.nanopool.org","eth-hk.dwarfpool.com",
      "eth-jp1.nanopool.org","eth-ru.dwarfpool.com",
      "eth-ru2.dwarfpool.com","eth-sg.dwarfpool.com",
      "eth-us-east1.nanopool.org","eth-us-west1.nanopool.org",
      "eth-us.dwarfpool.com","eth-us2.dwarfpool.com",
      "eu.stratum.slushpool.com","eu1.ethermine.org",
      "eu1.ethpool.org","fr.minexmr.com",
      "mine.moneropool.com","mine.xmrpool.net",
      "pool.minexmr.com","pool.monero.hashvault.pro",
      "pool.supportxmr.com","sg.minexmr.com",
      "sg.stratum.slushpool.com","stratum-eth.antpool.com",
      "stratum-ltc.antpool.com","stratum-zec.antpool.com",
      "stratum.antpool.com","us-east.stratum.slushpool.com",
      "us1.ethermine.org","us1.ethpool.org",
      "us2.ethermine.org","us2.ethpool.org",
      "xmr-asia1.nanopool.org","xmr-au1.nanopool.org",
      "xmr-eu1.nanopool.org","xmr-eu2.nanopool.org",
      "xmr-jp1.nanopool.org","xmr-us-east1.nanopool.org",
      "xmr-us-west1.nanopool.org","xmr.crypto-pool.fr",
      "xmr.pool.minergate.com", "rx.unmineable.com",
      "ss.antpool.com","dash.antpool.com",
      "eth.antpool.com","zec.antpool.com",
      "xmc.antpool.com","btm.antpool.com",
      "stratum-dash.antpool.com","stratum-xmc.antpool.com",
      "stratum-btm.antpool.com"
      ]

- list: https_miner_domains
  items: [
    "ca.minexmr.com",
    "cn.stratum.slushpool.com",
    "de.minexmr.com",
    "fr.minexmr.com",
    "mine.moneropool.com",
    "mine.xmrpool.net",
    "pool.minexmr.com",
    "sg.minexmr.com",
    "stratum-eth.antpool.com",
    "stratum-ltc.antpool.com",
    "stratum-zec.antpool.com",
    "stratum.antpool.com",
    "xmr.crypto-pool.fr",
    "ss.antpool.com",
    "stratum-dash.antpool.com",
    "stratum-xmc.antpool.com",
    "stratum-btm.antpool.com",
    "btm.antpool.com"
  ]

- list: http_miner_domains
  items: [
    "ca.minexmr.com",
    "de.minexmr.com",
    "fr.minexmr.com",
    "mine.moneropool.com",
    "mine.xmrpool.net",
    "pool.minexmr.com",
    "sg.minexmr.com",
    "xmr.crypto-pool.fr"
  ]

# Add rule based on crypto mining IOCs
- macro: minerpool_https
  condition: (fd.sport="443" and fd.sip.name in (https_miner_domains))

- macro: minerpool_http
  condition: (fd.sport="80" and fd.sip.name in (http_miner_domains))

- macro: minerpool_other
  condition: (fd.sport in (miner_ports) and fd.sip.name in (miner_domains))

- macro: net_miner_pool
  condition: (evt.type in (sendto, sendmsg, connect) and evt.dir=< and (fd.net != "127.0.0.0/8" and not fd.snet in (rfc_1918_addresses)) and ((minerpool_http) or (minerpool_https) or (minerpool_other)))

- macro: trusted_images_query_miner_domain_dns
  condition: (container.image.repository in (falco_containers))

# The rule is disabled by default.
# Note: falco will send DNS request to resolve miner pool domain which may trigger alerts in your environment.
- rule: Detect outbound connections to common miner pool ports
  desc: Miners typically connect to miner pools on common ports.
  condition: net_miner_pool and not trusted_images_query_miner_domain_dns
  enabled: false
  output: Outbound connection to IP/Port flagged by https://cryptoioc.ch (command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid port=%fd.rport ip=%fd.rip container=%container.info image=%container.image.repository)
  priority: CRITICAL
  tags: [host, container, network, mitre_execution, T1496]

- rule: Detect crypto miners using the Stratum protocol
  desc: Miners typically specify the mining pool to connect to with a URI that begins with 'stratum+tcp'
  condition: spawned_process and (proc.cmdline contains "stratum+tcp" or proc.cmdline contains "stratum2+tcp" or proc.cmdline contains "stratum+ssl" or proc.cmdline contains "stratum2+ssl")
  output: Possible miner running (command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid container=%container.info image=%container.image.repository exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags)
  priority: CRITICAL
  tags: [host, container, process, mitre_execution, T1496]

- list: k8s_client_binaries
  items: [docker, kubectl, crictl]

# TODO: Remove k8s.gcr.io reference after 01/Dec/2023
- list: user_known_k8s_ns_kube_system_images
  items: [
    k8s.gcr.io/fluentd-gcp-scaler,
    k8s.gcr.io/node-problem-detector/node-problem-detector,
    registry.k8s.io/fluentd-gcp-scaler,
    registry.k8s.io/node-problem-detector/node-problem-detector
  ]

- list: user_known_k8s_images
  items: [
    mcr.microsoft.com/aks/hcp/hcp-tunnel-front
  ]

# Whitelist for known docker client binaries run inside container
# - k8s.gcr.io/fluentd-gcp-scaler / registry.k8s.io/fluentd-gcp-scaler in GCP/GKE
# TODO: Remove k8s.gcr.io reference after 01/Dec/2023
- macro: user_known_k8s_client_container
  condition: >
    (k8s.ns.name="kube-system" and container.image.repository in (user_known_k8s_ns_kube_system_images)) or container.image.repository in (user_known_k8s_images)    

- macro: user_known_k8s_client_container_parens
  condition: (user_known_k8s_client_container)

- rule: The docker client is executed in a container
  desc: Detect a k8s client tool executed inside a container
  condition: spawned_process and container and not user_known_k8s_client_container_parens and proc.name in (k8s_client_binaries)
  output: "Docker or kubernetes client executed in container (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid %container.info parent=%proc.pname cmdline=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag)"
  priority: WARNING
  tags: [container, mitre_execution, T1610]

- list: user_known_packet_socket_binaries
  items: []

- rule: Packet socket created in container
  desc: Detect new packet socket at the device driver (OSI Layer 2) level in a container. Packet socket could be used for ARP Spoofing and privilege escalation(CVE-2020-14386) by attacker.
  condition: evt.type=socket and evt.arg[0] contains AF_PACKET and container and not proc.name in (user_known_packet_socket_binaries)
  output: Packet socket was created in a container (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid socket_info=%evt.args container_id=%container.id container_name=%container.name image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag)
  priority: NOTICE
  tags: [container, network, mitre_discovery, T1046]

# Namespaces where the rule is enforce
- list: namespace_scope_network_only_subnet
  items: []

- macro: network_local_subnet
  condition: >
    fd.rnet in (rfc_1918_addresses) or
    fd.ip = "0.0.0.0" or
    fd.net = "127.0.0.0/8"    

# # The rule is disabled by default.
# # How to test:
# # Add 'default' to namespace_scope_network_only_subnet
# # Run:
# kubectl run --generator=run-pod/v1 -n default -i --tty busybox --image=busybox --rm -- wget google.com -O /var/google.html
# # Check logs running

- rule: Network Connection outside Local Subnet
  desc: Detect traffic to image outside local subnet.
  condition: >
    inbound_outbound and
    container and
    not network_local_subnet and
    k8s.ns.name in (namespace_scope_network_only_subnet)    
  enabled: false
  output: >
    Network connection outside local subnet
    (command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid connection=%fd.name user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid container_id=%container.id
     image=%container.image.repository namespace=%k8s.ns.name
     fd.rip.name=%fd.rip.name fd.lip.name=%fd.lip.name fd.cip.name=%fd.cip.name fd.sip.name=%fd.sip.name)    
  priority: WARNING
  tags: [container, network, mitre_discovery, T1046]

- list: allowed_image
  items: [] # add image to monitor, i.e.: bitnami/nginx

- list: authorized_server_binary
  items: []  # add binary to allow, i.e.: nginx
  
- list: authorized_server_port
  items: [] # add port to allow, i.e.: 80

# # How to test:
# kubectl run --image=nginx nginx-app --port=80 --env="DOMAIN=cluster"
# kubectl expose deployment nginx-app --port=80 --name=nginx-http --type=LoadBalancer
# # On minikube:
# minikube service nginx-http
# # On general K8s:
# kubectl get services
# kubectl cluster-info
# # Visit the Nginx service and port, should not fire.
# # Change rule to different port, then different process name, and test again that it fires.

- rule: Outbound or Inbound Traffic not to Authorized Server Process and Port
  desc: Detect traffic that is not to authorized server process and port.
  condition: >
    inbound_outbound and
    container and
    container.image.repository in (allowed_image) and
    not proc.name in (authorized_server_binary) and
    not fd.sport in (authorized_server_port)    
  enabled: false
  output: >
    Network connection outside authorized port and binary
    (command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid connection=%fd.name user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid container_id=%container.id
    image=%container.image.repository)    
  priority: WARNING
  tags: [container, network, mitre_discovery, TA0011]

- macro: user_known_stand_streams_redirect_activities
  condition: (never_true)

- macro: dup
  condition: evt.type in (dup, dup2, dup3)

- rule: Redirect STDOUT/STDIN to Network Connection in Container
  desc: Detect redirecting stdout/stdin to network connection in container (potential reverse shell).
  condition: dup and container and evt.rawres in (0, 1, 2) and fd.type in ("ipv4", "ipv6") and not user_known_stand_streams_redirect_activities
  output: >
    Redirect stdout/stdin to network connection (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid %container.info process=%proc.name parent=%proc.pname cmdline=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid terminal=%proc.tty container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository fd.name=%fd.name fd.num=%fd.num fd.type=%fd.type fd.sip=%fd.sip)    
  priority: NOTICE
  tags: [container, network, process, mitre_discovery, mitre_execution, T1059]

# The two Container Drift rules below will fire when a new executable is created in a container.
# There are two ways to create executables - file is created with execution permissions or permissions change of existing file.
# We will use a new filter, is_open_exec, to find all files creations with execution permission, and will trace all chmods in a container.
# The use case we are targeting here is an attempt to execute code that was not shipped as part of a container (drift) -
# an activity that might be malicious or non-compliant.
# Two things to pay attention to:
#   1) In most cases, 'docker cp' will not be identified, but the assumption is that if an attacker gained access to the container runtime daemon, they are already privileged
#   2) Drift rules will be noisy in environments in which containers are built (e.g. docker build)
# These two rules are not enabled by default.

- macro: user_known_container_drift_activities
  condition: (always_true)

- rule: Container Drift Detected (chmod)
  desc: New executable created in a container due to chmod
  condition: >
    chmod and
    container and
    not runc_writing_exec_fifo and
    not runc_writing_var_lib_docker and
    not user_known_container_drift_activities and
    evt.rawres>=0 and
    ((evt.arg.mode contains "S_IXUSR") or
    (evt.arg.mode contains "S_IXGRP") or
    (evt.arg.mode contains "S_IXOTH"))    
  enabled: false
  output: Drift detected (chmod), new executable created in a container (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid filename=%evt.arg.filename name=%evt.arg.name mode=%evt.arg.mode event=%evt.type)
  priority: ERROR
  tags: [container, process, filesystem, mitre_execution, T1059]

# ****************************************************************************
# * "Container Drift Detected (open+create)" requires FALCO_ENGINE_VERSION 6 *
# ****************************************************************************
- rule: Container Drift Detected (open+create)
  desc: New executable created in a container due to open+create
  condition: >
    evt.type in (open,openat,openat2,creat) and
    evt.is_open_exec=true and
    container and
    not runc_writing_exec_fifo and
    not runc_writing_var_lib_docker and
    not user_known_container_drift_activities and
    evt.rawres>=0    
  enabled: false
  output: Drift detected (open+create), new executable created in a container (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid filename=%evt.arg.filename name=%evt.arg.name mode=%evt.arg.mode event=%evt.type)
  priority: ERROR
  tags: [container, process, filesystem, mitre_execution, T1059]

- list: c2_server_ip_list
  items: []

- list: c2_server_fqdn_list
  items: []

# For example, you can fetch a list of IP addresses and FQDN on this website:
# https://feodotracker.abuse.ch/downloads/ipblocklist_recommended.json.
# Use Falco HELM chart to update (append) the c2 server lists with your values.
# See an example below.
#
#  ```yaml
#  # values.yaml Falco HELM chart file
#  [...]
#  customRules:
#    c2-servers-list.yaml: |-
#      - list: c2_server_ip_list
#        append: true
#        items: 
#        - "'51.178.161.32'"
#        - "'46.101.90.205'"
#        
#      - list: c2_server_fqdn_list
#        append: true
#        items: 
#        - "srv-web.ffconsulting.com"
#        - "57.ip-142-44-247.net"
#  ```

- rule: Outbound Connection to C2 Servers
  desc: Detect outbound connection to command & control servers thanks to a list of IP addresses & a list of FQDN.
  condition: >
    outbound and 
    ((fd.sip in (c2_server_ip_list)) or
     (fd.sip.name in (c2_server_fqdn_list)))    
  output: Outbound connection to C2 server (c2_domain=%fd.sip.name c2_addr=%fd.sip command=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
  priority: WARNING
  enabled: false
  tags: [host, container, network, mitre_command_and_control, TA0011]

- list: allowed_container_images_loading_kernel_module
  items: []

# init_module and finit_module syscalls are available since Falco 0.35.0
# rule coverage now extends to modprobe usage via init_module logging
# and previous alerting on spawned_process and insmod is now covered
# by finit_module syscall
- rule: Linux Kernel Module Injection Detected
  desc: Detect kernel module was injected (from container).
  condition: kernel_module_load and container
    and not container.image.repository in (allowed_container_images_loading_kernel_module)
    and thread.cap_effective icontains sys_module
  output: Linux Kernel Module injection from container detected (user=%user.name uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process_name=%proc.name parent_process_name=%proc.pname parent_exepath=%proc.pexepath %proc.aname[2] %proc.aexepath[2] module=%proc.args %container.info image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag res=%evt.res syscall=%evt.type)
  priority: WARNING
  tags: [host, container, process, mitre_execution, mitre_persistence, TA0002]

- list: run_as_root_image_list
  items: []

- macro: user_known_run_as_root_container
  condition: (container.image.repository in (run_as_root_image_list))

# The rule is disabled by default and should be enabled when non-root container policy has been applied.
# Note the rule will not work as expected when usernamespace is applied, e.g. userns-remap is enabled.
- rule: Container Run as Root User
  desc: Detected container running as root user
  condition: spawned_process and container and proc.vpid=1 and user.uid=0 and not user_known_run_as_root_container
  enabled: false
  output: Container launched with root user privilege (uid=%user.uid container_id=%container.id container_name=%container.name image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags)
  priority: INFO
  tags: [container, process, users, mitre_execution, T1610]

# This rule helps detect CVE-2021-3156:
# A privilege escalation to root through heap-based buffer overflow
- rule: Sudo Potential Privilege Escalation
  desc: Privilege escalation vulnerability affecting sudo (<= 1.9.5p2). Executing sudo using sudoedit -s or sudoedit -i command with command-line argument that ends with a single backslash character from an unprivileged user it's possible to elevate the user privileges to root.
  condition: spawned_process and user.uid != 0 and (proc.name=sudoedit or proc.name = sudo) and (proc.args contains -s or proc.args contains -i or proc.args contains --login) and (proc.args contains "\ " or proc.args endswith \)
  output: "Detect Sudo Privilege Escalation Exploit (CVE-2021-3156) (user=%user.name parent=%proc.pname cmdline=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info)"
  priority: CRITICAL
  tags: [host, container, filesystem, users, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1548.003]

- rule: Debugfs Launched in Privileged Container
  desc: Detect file system debugger debugfs launched inside a privileged container which might lead to container escape.
  condition: >
    spawned_process and container
    and container.privileged=true
    and proc.name=debugfs    
  output: Debugfs launched started in a privileged container (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid %container.info image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags)
  priority: WARNING
  tags: [container, cis, process, mitre_execution, mitre_lateral_movement, T1611]

- macro: mount_info
  condition: (proc.args="" or proc.args intersects ("-V", "-l", "-h"))

- macro: known_gke_mount_in_privileged_containers
  condition:
    (k8s.ns.name = kube-system
    and container.image.repository = gke.gcr.io/gcp-compute-persistent-disk-csi-driver)

- macro: known_aks_mount_in_privileged_containers
  condition:
    ((k8s.ns.name = kube-system and container.image.repository in (mcr.microsoft.com/oss/kubernetes-csi/azuredisk-csi,mcr.microsoft.com/oss/kubernetes-csi/azurefile-csi))
    or (k8s.ns.name = system and container.image.repository = mcr.microsoft.com/oss/kubernetes-csi/secrets-store/driver))

- macro: user_known_mount_in_privileged_containers
  condition: (never_true)

- rule: Mount Launched in Privileged Container
  desc: Detect file system mount happened inside a privileged container which might lead to container escape.
  condition: >
    spawned_process and container
    and container.privileged=true
    and proc.name=mount
    and not mount_info
    and not known_gke_mount_in_privileged_containers
    and not known_aks_mount_in_privileged_containers
    and not user_known_mount_in_privileged_containers    
  output: Mount was executed inside a privileged container (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid %container.info image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags)
  priority: WARNING
  tags: [container, cis, filesystem, mitre_lateral_movement, T1611]

- list: user_known_userfaultfd_processes
  items: []

- rule: Unprivileged Delegation of Page Faults Handling to a Userspace Process
  desc: Detect a successful unprivileged userfaultfd syscall which might act as an attack primitive to exploit other bugs
  condition: >
    evt.type = userfaultfd and
    user.uid != 0 and
    (evt.rawres >= 0 or evt.res != -1) and
    not proc.name in (user_known_userfaultfd_processes)    
  output: An userfaultfd syscall was successfully executed by an unprivileged user (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid %container.info image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag)
  priority: CRITICAL
  tags: [host, container, process, mitre_defense_evasion, TA0005]

- list: ingress_remote_file_copy_binaries
  items: [wget]

- macro: ingress_remote_file_copy_procs
  condition: (proc.name in (ingress_remote_file_copy_binaries))

# Users should overwrite this macro to specify conditions under which a
# Custom condition for use of ingress remote file copy tool in container
- macro: user_known_ingress_remote_file_copy_activities
  condition: (never_true)

- macro: curl_download
  condition: proc.name = curl and
              (proc.cmdline contains " -o " or
              proc.cmdline contains " --output " or
              proc.cmdline contains " -O " or
              proc.cmdline contains " --remote-name ")

- rule: Launch Ingress Remote File Copy Tools in Container
  desc: Detect ingress remote file copy tools launched in container
  condition: >
    spawned_process and
    container and
    (ingress_remote_file_copy_procs or curl_download) and
    not user_known_ingress_remote_file_copy_activities    
  output: >
    Ingress remote file copy tool launched in container (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid parent_process=%proc.pname
    container_id=%container.id container_name=%container.name image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags)    
  priority: NOTICE
  tags: [container, network, process, mitre_command_and_control, TA0011]

# This rule helps detect CVE-2021-4034:
# A privilege escalation to root through memory corruption
- rule: Polkit Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability (CVE-2021-4034)
  desc: "This rule detects an attempt to exploit a privilege escalation vulnerability in Polkit's pkexec. By running specially crafted code, a local user can leverage this flaw to gain root privileges on a compromised system"
  condition:
    spawned_process and user.uid != 0 and proc.name=pkexec and proc.args = ''
  output:
    "Detect Polkit pkexec Local Privilege Escalation Exploit (CVE-2021-4034) (user=%user.loginname uid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid args=%proc.args exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags)"
  priority: CRITICAL
  tags: [host, container, process, users, mitre_privilege_escalation, TA0004]


- rule: Detect release_agent File Container Escapes
  desc: "This rule detect an attempt to exploit a container escape using release_agent file. By running a container with certains capabilities, a privileged user can modify release_agent file and escape from the container"
  condition:
    open_write and container and fd.name endswith release_agent and (user.uid=0 or thread.cap_effective contains CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) and thread.cap_effective contains CAP_SYS_ADMIN
  output:
    "Detect an attempt to exploit a container escape using release_agent file (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid filename=%fd.name %container.info image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag cap_effective=%thread.cap_effective)"
  priority: CRITICAL
  tags: [container, process, mitre_privilege_escalation, mitre_lateral_movement, T1611]

# Rule for detecting potential Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228) exploitation
# Note: Not compatible with Java 17+, which uses read() syscalls
- macro: java_network_read
  condition: (evt.type=recvfrom and fd.type in (ipv4, ipv6) and proc.name=java)

- rule: Java Process Class File Download
  desc: Detected Java process downloading a class file which could indicate a successful exploit of the log4shell Log4j vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228)
  condition: >
        java_network_read and evt.buffer bcontains cafebabe        
  output: Java process class file download (user=%user.name user_loginname=%user.loginname user_loginuid=%user.loginuid event=%evt.type connection=%fd.name server_ip=%fd.sip server_port=%fd.sport proto=%fd.l4proto process=%proc.name command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid parent=%proc.pname buffer=%evt.buffer container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
  priority: CRITICAL
  enabled: false
  tags: [host, container, process, mitre_initial_access, T1190]

- list: docker_binaries
  items: [docker, dockerd, containerd-shim, "runc:[1:CHILD]", pause, exe, docker-compose, docker-entrypoi, docker-runc-cur, docker-current, dockerd-current]

- macro: docker_procs
  condition: proc.name in (docker_binaries)

- rule: Modify Container Entrypoint
  desc: This rule detect an attempt to write on container entrypoint symlink (/proc/self/exe). Possible CVE-2019-5736 Container Breakout exploitation attempt.
  condition: >
    open_write and container and (fd.name=/proc/self/exe or fd.name startswith /proc/self/fd/) and not docker_procs and not proc.cmdline = "runc:[1:CHILD] init"    
  enabled: false
  output: >
    Detect Potential Container Breakout Exploit (CVE-2019-5736) (user=%user.name process=%proc.name file=%fd.name cmdline=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid %container.info)    
  priority: WARNING
  tags: [container, filesystem, mitre_initial_access, T1611]

- list: known_binaries_to_read_environment_variables_from_proc_files
  items: [scsi_id, argoexec]

- rule: Read environment variable from /proc files
  desc: An attempt to read process environment variables from /proc files
  condition: >
    open_read and container and (fd.name glob /proc/*/environ)
    and not proc.name in (known_binaries_to_read_environment_variables_from_proc_files)    
  output: >
    Environment variables were retrieved from /proc files (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid program=%proc.name
    command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid file=%fd.name parent=%proc.pname gparent=%proc.aname[2] ggparent=%proc.aname[3] gggparent=%proc.aname[4] container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)    
  priority: WARNING
  tags: [container, filesystem, process, mitre_credential_access, mitre_discovery, T1083]

- list: known_ptrace_binaries
  items: []

- macro: known_ptrace_procs
  condition: (proc.name in (known_ptrace_binaries))

- macro: ptrace_attach_or_injection
  condition: >
    evt.type=ptrace and evt.dir=> and
    (evt.arg.request contains PTRACE_POKETEXT or
    evt.arg.request contains PTRACE_POKEDATA or
    evt.arg.request contains PTRACE_ATTACH or
    evt.arg.request contains PTRACE_SEIZE or
    evt.arg.request contains PTRACE_SETREGS)    

- rule: PTRACE attached to process
  desc: "This rule detects an attempt to inject code into a process using PTRACE."
  condition: ptrace_attach_or_injection and proc_name_exists and not known_ptrace_procs
  output: > 
    Detected ptrace PTRACE_ATTACH attempt (proc.cmdline=%proc.cmdline container=%container.info evt.type=%evt.type evt.arg.request=%evt.arg.request proc.pid=%proc.pid proc.cwd=%proc.cwd proc.ppid=%proc.ppid
    proc.pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline proc.sid=%proc.sid proc.exepath=%proc.exepath user.uid=%user.uid user.loginuid=%user.loginuid user.loginname=%user.loginname user.name=%user.name group.gid=%group.gid
    group.name=%group.name container.id=%container.id container.name=%container.name image=%container.image.repository)
  priority: WARNING
  tags: [host, container, process, mitre_execution, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1055.008]
  
- rule: PTRACE anti-debug attempt
  desc: "Detect usage of the PTRACE system call with the PTRACE_TRACEME argument, indicating a program actively attempting to avoid debuggers attaching to the process. This behavior is typically indicative of malware activity."
  condition: evt.type=ptrace and evt.dir=> and evt.arg.request contains PTRACE_TRACEME and proc_name_exists
  output: Detected potential PTRACE_TRACEME anti-debug attempt (proc.cmdline=%proc.cmdline container=%container.info evt.type=%evt.type evt.arg.request=%evt.arg.request proc.pid=%proc.pid proc.cwd=%proc.cwd proc.ppid=%proc.ppid proc.pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline proc.sid=%proc.sid proc.exepath=%proc.exepath user.uid=%user.uid user.loginuid=%user.loginuid user.loginname=%user.loginname user.name=%user.name group.gid=%group.gid group.name=%group.name container.id=%container.id container.name=%container.name image=%container.image.repository)
  priority: NOTICE
  tags: [host, container, process, mitre_defense_evasion, T1622]

- macro: private_aws_credentials
  condition: >
    (proc.args icontains "aws_access_key_id" or
    proc.args icontains "aws_secret_access_key" or
    proc.args icontains "aws_session_token" or
    proc.args icontains "accesskeyid" or
    proc.args icontains "secretaccesskey")    

- rule: Find AWS Credentials
  desc: Find or grep AWS credentials
  condition: >
    spawned_process and
    ((grep_commands and private_aws_credentials) or
    (proc.name = "find" and proc.args endswith ".aws/credentials"))    
  output: Detected AWS credentials search activity (user.name=%user.name user.loginuid=%user.loginuid proc.cmdline=%proc.cmdline container.id=%container.id container_name=%container.name evt.type=%evt.type evt.res=%evt.res proc.pid=%proc.pid proc.cwd=%proc.cwd proc.ppid=%proc.ppid proc.pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline proc.sid=%proc.sid proc.exepath=%proc.exepath user.uid=%user.uid user.loginname=%user.loginname group.gid=%group.gid group.name=%group.name container.name=%container.name image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags)
  priority: WARNING
  tags: [host, container, mitre_credential_access, process, aws, T1552]

- rule: Execution from /dev/shm
  desc: This rule detects file execution from the /dev/shm directory, a common tactic for threat actors to stash their readable+writable+(sometimes)executable files.
  condition: >
    spawned_process and 
    (proc.exe startswith "/dev/shm/" or 
    (proc.cwd startswith "/dev/shm/" and proc.exe startswith "./" ) or 
    (shell_procs and proc.args startswith "-c /dev/shm") or 
    (shell_procs and proc.args startswith "-i /dev/shm") or 
    (shell_procs and proc.args startswith "/dev/shm") or 
    (proc.cwd startswith "/dev/shm/" and proc.args startswith "./" )) and 
    not container.image.repository in (falco_privileged_images, trusted_images)    
  output: "File execution detected from /dev/shm (proc.cmdline=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name user.name=%user.name user.loginuid=%user.loginuid container.id=%container.id evt.type=%evt.type evt.res=%evt.res proc.pid=%proc.pid proc.cwd=%proc.cwd proc.ppid=%proc.ppid proc.pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline proc.sid=%proc.sid proc.exepath=%proc.exepath user.uid=%user.uid user.loginname=%user.loginname group.gid=%group.gid group.name=%group.name container.name=%container.name image=%container.image.repository exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags)"
  priority: WARNING
  tags: [host, container, mitre_execution, mitre_defense_evasion, T1036.005, T1059.004]
  
# List of allowed container images that are known to execute binaries not part of their base image.
# Users can use this list to better tune the rule below (i.e reducing false positives) by considering their workloads, 
# since this requires application specific knowledge.
- list: known_drop_and_execute_containers
  items: []

- rule: Drop and execute new binary in container
  desc:
    Detect if an executable not belonging to the base image of a container is being executed.
    The drop and execute pattern can be observed very often after an attacker gained an initial foothold.
    is_exe_upper_layer filter field only applies for container runtimes that use overlayfs as union mount filesystem.
  condition: >
    spawned_process
    and container
    and proc.is_exe_upper_layer=true 
    and not container.image.repository in (known_drop_and_execute_containers)    
  output: > 
    Executing binary not part of base image (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid user_uid=%user.uid comm=%proc.cmdline exe=%proc.exe container_id=%container.id
    image=%container.image.repository proc.name=%proc.name proc.sname=%proc.sname proc.pname=%proc.pname proc.aname[2]=%proc.aname[2] exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags
    proc.exe_ino=%proc.exe_ino proc.exe_ino.ctime=%proc.exe_ino.ctime proc.exe_ino.mtime=%proc.exe_ino.mtime proc.exe_ino.ctime_duration_proc_start=%proc.exe_ino.ctime_duration_proc_start
    proc.exepath=%proc.exepath proc.cwd=%proc.cwd proc.tty=%proc.tty container.start_ts=%container.start_ts proc.sid=%proc.sid proc.vpgid=%proc.vpgid evt.res=%evt.res)
  priority: CRITICAL 
  tags: [container, mitre_persistence, TA0003]

# Application rules have moved to application_rules.yaml. Please look
# there if you want to enable them by adding to
# falco_rules.local.yaml.