805 lines
33 KiB
YAML
805 lines
33 KiB
YAML
# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
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#
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# Copyright (C) 2023 The Falco Authors.
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#
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#
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# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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# You may obtain a copy of the License at
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#
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# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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#
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# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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# limitations under the License.
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#
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- required_engine_version: 15
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- required_plugin_versions:
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- name: k8saudit
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version: 0.7.0
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alternatives:
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- name: k8saudit-eks
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version: 0.4.0
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- name: k8saudit-gke
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version: 0.1.0
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- name: json
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version: 0.7.0
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# Like always_true/always_false, but works with k8s audit events
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- macro: k8s_audit_always_true
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condition: (jevt.rawtime exists)
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- macro: k8s_audit_never_true
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condition: (jevt.rawtime=0)
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# Generally only consider audit events once the response has completed
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- list: k8s_audit_stages
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items: ["ResponseComplete"]
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# Generally exclude users starting with "system:"
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- macro: non_system_user
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condition: (not ka.user.name startswith "system:")
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# This macro selects the set of Audit Events used by the below rules.
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- macro: kevt
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condition: (jevt.value[/stage] in (k8s_audit_stages))
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- macro: kevt_started
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condition: (jevt.value[/stage]=ResponseStarted)
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# If you wish to restrict activity to a specific set of users, override/append to this list.
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# users created by kops are included
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- list: vertical_pod_autoscaler_users
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items: ["vpa-recommender", "vpa-updater"]
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- list: allowed_k8s_users
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items: [
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"minikube", "minikube-user", "kubelet", "kops", "admin", "kube", "kube-proxy", "kube-apiserver-healthcheck",
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"kubernetes-admin",
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vertical_pod_autoscaler_users,
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cluster-autoscaler,
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"system:addon-manager",
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"cloud-controller-manager",
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"system:kube-controller-manager"
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]
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- list: eks_allowed_k8s_users
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items: [
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"eks:node-manager",
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"eks:certificate-controller",
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"eks:fargate-scheduler",
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"eks:k8s-metrics",
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"eks:authenticator",
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"eks:cluster-event-watcher",
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"eks:nodewatcher",
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"eks:pod-identity-mutating-webhook",
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"eks:cloud-controller-manager",
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"eks:vpc-resource-controller",
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"eks:addon-manager",
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]
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- list: k8s_audit_sensitive_mount_images
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items: [
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falcosecurity/falco, docker.io/falcosecurity/falco, public.ecr.aws/falcosecurity/falco,
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docker.io/sysdig/sysdig, sysdig/sysdig,
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gcr.io/google_containers/hyperkube,
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gcr.io/google_containers/kube-proxy, docker.io/calico/node,
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docker.io/rook/toolbox, docker.io/cloudnativelabs/kube-router, docker.io/consul,
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docker.io/datadog/docker-dd-agent, docker.io/datadog/agent, docker.io/docker/ucp-agent, docker.io/gliderlabs/logspout,
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docker.io/netdata/netdata, docker.io/google/cadvisor, docker.io/prom/node-exporter,
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amazon/amazon-ecs-agent, prom/node-exporter, amazon/cloudwatch-agent
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]
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- list: k8s_audit_privileged_images
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items: [
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falcosecurity/falco, docker.io/falcosecurity/falco, public.ecr.aws/falcosecurity/falco,
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docker.io/calico/node, calico/node,
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docker.io/cloudnativelabs/kube-router,
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docker.io/docker/ucp-agent,
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docker.io/mesosphere/mesos-slave,
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docker.io/rook/toolbox,
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docker.io/sysdig/sysdig,
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gcr.io/google_containers/kube-proxy,
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gcr.io/google-containers/startup-script,
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gcr.io/projectcalico-org/node,
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gke.gcr.io/kube-proxy,
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gke.gcr.io/gke-metadata-server,
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gke.gcr.io/netd-amd64,
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gke.gcr.io/watcher-daemonset,
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gcr.io/google-containers/prometheus-to-sd,
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registry.k8s.io/ip-masq-agent-amd64,
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registry.k8s.io/kube-proxy,
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registry.k8s.io/prometheus-to-sd,
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quay.io/calico/node,
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sysdig/sysdig,
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registry.k8s.io/dns/k8s-dns-node-cache,
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mcr.microsoft.com/oss/kubernetes/kube-proxy
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]
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- rule: Disallowed K8s User
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desc: Detect any k8s operation by users outside of an allowed set of users.
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condition: kevt and non_system_user and not ka.user.name in (allowed_k8s_users) and not ka.user.name in (eks_allowed_k8s_users)
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output: K8s Operation performed by user not in allowed list of users (user=%ka.user.name target=%ka.target.name/%ka.target.resource verb=%ka.verb uri=%ka.uri resp=%ka.response.code)
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priority: WARNING
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source: k8s_audit
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tags: [k8s]
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# In a local/user rules file, you could override this macro to
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# explicitly enumerate the container images that you want to run in
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# your environment. In this main falco rules file, there isn't any way
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# to know all the containers that can run, so any container is
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# allowed, by using the always_true macro. In the overridden macro, the condition
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# would look something like (ka.req.pod.containers.image.repository in (my-repo/my-image))
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- macro: allowed_k8s_containers
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condition: (k8s_audit_always_true)
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- macro: response_successful
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condition: (ka.response.code startswith 2)
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- macro: kget
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condition: ka.verb=get
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- macro: kcreate
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condition: ka.verb=create
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- macro: kmodify
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condition: (ka.verb in (create,update,patch))
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- macro: kdelete
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condition: ka.verb=delete
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- macro: pod
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condition: ka.target.resource=pods and not ka.target.subresource exists
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- macro: pod_subresource
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condition: ka.target.resource=pods and ka.target.subresource exists
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- macro: deployment
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condition: ka.target.resource=deployments
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- macro: service
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condition: ka.target.resource=services
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- macro: configmap
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condition: ka.target.resource=configmaps
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- macro: namespace
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condition: ka.target.resource=namespaces
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- macro: serviceaccount
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condition: ka.target.resource=serviceaccounts
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- macro: clusterrole
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condition: ka.target.resource=clusterroles
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- macro: clusterrolebinding
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condition: ka.target.resource=clusterrolebindings
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- macro: role
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condition: ka.target.resource=roles
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- macro: secret
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condition: ka.target.resource=secrets
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- macro: health_endpoint
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condition: ka.uri=/healthz or ka.uri startswith /healthz?
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- macro: live_endpoint
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condition: ka.uri=/livez or ka.uri startswith /livez?
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- macro: ready_endpoint
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condition: ka.uri=/readyz or ka.uri startswith /readyz?
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- rule: Create Disallowed Pod
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desc: >
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Detect an attempt to start a pod with a container image outside of a list of allowed images.
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condition: kevt and pod and kcreate and not allowed_k8s_containers
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output: Pod started with container not in allowed list (user=%ka.user.name pod=%ka.resp.name ns=%ka.target.namespace images=%ka.req.pod.containers.image)
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priority: WARNING
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source: k8s_audit
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tags: [k8s]
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- rule: Create Privileged Pod
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desc: >
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Detect an attempt to start a pod with a privileged container
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condition: kevt and pod and kcreate and ka.req.pod.containers.privileged intersects (true) and not ka.req.pod.containers.image.repository in (k8s_audit_privileged_images)
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output: Pod started with privileged container (user=%ka.user.name pod=%ka.resp.name resource=%ka.target.resource ns=%ka.target.namespace images=%ka.req.pod.containers.image)
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priority: WARNING
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source: k8s_audit
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tags: [k8s]
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- macro: sensitive_vol_mount
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condition: >
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(ka.req.pod.volumes.hostpath intersects (/proc, /var/run/docker.sock, /, /etc, /root, /var/run/crio/crio.sock, /run/containerd/containerd.sock, /home/admin, /var/lib/kubelet, /var/lib/kubelet/pki, /etc/kubernetes, /etc/kubernetes/manifests))
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- rule: Create Sensitive Mount Pod
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desc: >
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Detect an attempt to start a pod with a volume from a sensitive host directory (i.e. /proc).
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Exceptions are made for known trusted images.
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condition: kevt and pod and kcreate and sensitive_vol_mount and not ka.req.pod.containers.image.repository in (k8s_audit_sensitive_mount_images)
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output: Pod started with sensitive mount (user=%ka.user.name pod=%ka.resp.name ns=%ka.target.namespace resource=%ka.target.resource images=%ka.req.pod.containers.image volumes=%jevt.value[/requestObject/spec/volumes])
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priority: WARNING
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source: k8s_audit
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tags: [k8s]
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# These container images are allowed to run with hostnetwork=true
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# TODO: Remove k8s.gcr.io reference after 01/Dec/2023
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- list: k8s_audit_hostnetwork_images
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items: [
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gcr.io/google-containers/prometheus-to-sd,
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gcr.io/projectcalico-org/typha,
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gcr.io/projectcalico-org/node,
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gke.gcr.io/gke-metadata-server,
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gke.gcr.io/kube-proxy,
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gke.gcr.io/netd-amd64,
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registry.k8s.io/ip-masq-agent-amd64,
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registry.k8s.io/prometheus-to-sd
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]
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# Corresponds to K8s CIS Benchmark 1.7.4
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- rule: Create HostNetwork Pod
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desc: Detect an attempt to start a pod using the host network.
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condition: kevt and pod and kcreate and ka.req.pod.host_network intersects (true) and not ka.req.pod.containers.image.repository in (k8s_audit_hostnetwork_images)
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output: Pod started using host network (user=%ka.user.name pod=%ka.resp.name resource=%ka.target.resource ns=%ka.target.namespace images=%ka.req.pod.containers.image)
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priority: WARNING
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source: k8s_audit
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tags: [k8s]
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- list: k8s_audit_hostpid_images
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items: []
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- rule: Create HostPid Pod
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desc: Detect an attempt to start a pod using the host pid namespace.
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condition: kevt and pod and kcreate and ka.req.pod.host_pid intersects (true) and not ka.req.pod.containers.image.repository in (k8s_audit_hostpid_images)
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output: Pod started using host pid namespace (user=%ka.user.name pod=%ka.resp.name resource=%ka.target.resource ns=%ka.target.namespace images=%ka.req.pod.containers.image)
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priority: WARNING
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source: k8s_audit
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tags: [k8s]
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- list: k8s_audit_hostipc_images
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items: []
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- rule: Create HostIPC Pod
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desc: Detect an attempt to start a pod using the host ipc namespace.
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condition: kevt and pod and kcreate and ka.req.pod.host_ipc intersects (true) and not ka.req.pod.containers.image.repository in (k8s_audit_hostipc_images)
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output: Pod started using host ipc namespace (user=%ka.user.name pod=%ka.resp.name resource=%ka.target.resource ns=%ka.target.namespace images=%ka.req.pod.containers.image)
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priority: WARNING
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source: k8s_audit
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tags: [k8s]
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- macro: user_known_node_port_service
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condition: (k8s_audit_never_true)
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- rule: Create NodePort Service
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desc: >
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Detect an attempt to start a service with a NodePort service type
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condition: kevt and service and kcreate and ka.req.service.type=NodePort and not user_known_node_port_service
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output: NodePort Service Created (user=%ka.user.name service=%ka.target.name resource=%ka.target.resource ns=%ka.target.namespace ports=%ka.req.service.ports)
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priority: WARNING
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source: k8s_audit
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tags: [k8s]
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- macro: contains_private_credentials
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condition: >
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(ka.req.configmap.obj contains "aws_access_key_id" or
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ka.req.configmap.obj contains "aws-access-key-id" or
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ka.req.configmap.obj contains "aws_s3_access_key_id" or
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ka.req.configmap.obj contains "aws-s3-access-key-id" or
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ka.req.configmap.obj contains "password" or
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ka.req.configmap.obj contains "passphrase")
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- rule: Create/Modify Configmap With Private Credentials
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desc: >
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Detect creating/modifying a configmap containing a private credential (aws key, password, etc.)
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condition: kevt and configmap and kmodify and contains_private_credentials
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output: K8s configmap with private credential (user=%ka.user.name verb=%ka.verb resource=%ka.target.resource configmap=%ka.req.configmap.name config=%ka.req.configmap.obj)
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priority: WARNING
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source: k8s_audit
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tags: [k8s]
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# Corresponds to K8s CIS Benchmark, 1.1.1.
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- rule: Anonymous Request Allowed
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desc: >
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Detect any request made by the anonymous user that was allowed
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condition: kevt and ka.user.name=system:anonymous and ka.auth.decision="allow" and not health_endpoint and not live_endpoint and not ready_endpoint
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output: Request by anonymous user allowed (user=%ka.user.name verb=%ka.verb uri=%ka.uri reason=%ka.auth.reason))
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priority: WARNING
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source: k8s_audit
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tags: [k8s]
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# Roughly corresponds to K8s CIS Benchmark, 1.1.12. In this case,
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# notifies an attempt to exec/attach to a privileged container.
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# Ideally, we'd add a more stringent rule that detects attaches/execs
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# to a privileged pod, but that requires the engine for k8s audit
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# events to be stateful, so it could know if a container named in an
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# attach request was created privileged or not. For now, we have a
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# less severe rule that detects attaches/execs to any pod.
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#
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# For the same reason, you can't use things like image names/prefixes,
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# as the event that creates the pod (which has the images) is a
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# separate event than the actual exec/attach to the pod.
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- macro: user_known_exec_pod_activities
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condition: (k8s_audit_never_true)
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- rule: Attach/Exec Pod
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desc: >
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Detect any attempt to attach/exec to a pod
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condition: kevt_started and pod_subresource and kcreate and ka.target.subresource in (exec,attach) and not user_known_exec_pod_activities
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output: Attach/Exec to pod (user=%ka.user.name pod=%ka.target.name resource=%ka.target.resource ns=%ka.target.namespace action=%ka.target.subresource command=%ka.uri.param[command])
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priority: NOTICE
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source: k8s_audit
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tags: [k8s]
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- macro: user_known_portforward_activities
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condition: (k8s_audit_never_true)
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- rule: port-forward
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desc: >
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Detect any attempt to portforward
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condition: ka.target.subresource in (portforward) and not user_known_portforward_activities
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output: Portforward to pod (user=%ka.user.name pod=%ka.target.name ns=%ka.target.namespace action=%ka.target.subresource )
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priority: NOTICE
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source: k8s_audit
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tags: [k8s]
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- macro: user_known_pod_debug_activities
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condition: (k8s_audit_never_true)
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# Only works when feature gate EphemeralContainers is enabled
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- rule: EphemeralContainers Created
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desc: >
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Detect any ephemeral container created
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condition: kevt and pod_subresource and kmodify and ka.target.subresource in (ephemeralcontainers) and not user_known_pod_debug_activities
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output: Ephemeral container is created in pod (user=%ka.user.name pod=%ka.target.name resource=%ka.target.resource ns=%ka.target.namespace ephemeral_container_name=%jevt.value[/requestObject/ephemeralContainers/0/name] ephemeral_container_image=%jevt.value[/requestObject/ephemeralContainers/0/image])
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priority: NOTICE
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source: k8s_audit
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tags: [k8s]
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# In a local/user rules fie, you can append to this list to add additional allowed namespaces
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- list: allowed_namespaces
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items: [kube-system, kube-public, default]
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- rule: Create Disallowed Namespace
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desc: Detect any attempt to create a namespace outside of a set of known namespaces
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condition: kevt and namespace and kcreate and not ka.target.name in (allowed_namespaces)
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output: Disallowed namespace created (user=%ka.user.name ns=%ka.target.name resource=%ka.target.resource)
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priority: WARNING
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source: k8s_audit
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tags: [k8s]
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# Only defined for backwards compatibility. Use the more specific
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# user_allowed_kube_namespace_image_list instead.
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- list: user_trusted_image_list
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items: []
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- list: user_allowed_kube_namespace_image_list
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items: [user_trusted_image_list]
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# Only defined for backwards compatibility. Use the more specific
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# allowed_kube_namespace_image_list instead.
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- list: k8s_image_list
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items: []
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# TODO: Remove k8s.gcr.io reference after 01/Dec/2023
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- list: allowed_kube_namespace_image_list
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items: [
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gcr.io/google-containers/prometheus-to-sd,
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gcr.io/projectcalico-org/node,
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gke.gcr.io/addon-resizer,
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gke.gcr.io/heapster,
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gke.gcr.io/gke-metadata-server,
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registry.k8s.io/ip-masq-agent-amd64,
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registry.k8s.io/kube-apiserver,
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gke.gcr.io/kube-proxy,
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gke.gcr.io/netd-amd64,
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gke.gcr.io/watcher-daemonset,
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registry.k8s.io/addon-resizer,
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registry.k8s.io/prometheus-to-sd,
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registry.k8s.io/k8s-dns-dnsmasq-nanny-amd64,
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registry.k8s.io/k8s-dns-kube-dns-amd64,
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registry.k8s.io/k8s-dns-sidecar-amd64,
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registry.k8s.io/metrics-server-amd64,
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kope/kube-apiserver-healthcheck,
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k8s_image_list
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]
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- macro: allowed_kube_namespace_pods
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condition: (ka.req.pod.containers.image.repository in (user_allowed_kube_namespace_image_list) or
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ka.req.pod.containers.image.repository in (allowed_kube_namespace_image_list))
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# Detect any new pod created in the kube-system namespace
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- rule: Pod Created in Kube Namespace
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desc: Detect any attempt to create a pod in the kube-system or kube-public namespaces
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|
condition: kevt and pod and kcreate and ka.target.namespace in (kube-system, kube-public) and not allowed_kube_namespace_pods
|
|
output: Pod created in kube namespace (user=%ka.user.name pod=%ka.resp.name resource=%ka.target.resource ns=%ka.target.namespace images=%ka.req.pod.containers.image)
|
|
priority: WARNING
|
|
source: k8s_audit
|
|
tags: [k8s]
|
|
|
|
- list: user_known_sa_list
|
|
items: []
|
|
|
|
- list: known_sa_list
|
|
items: [
|
|
coredns,
|
|
coredns-autoscaler,
|
|
cronjob-controller,
|
|
daemon-set-controller,
|
|
deployment-controller,
|
|
disruption-controller,
|
|
endpoint-controller,
|
|
endpointslice-controller,
|
|
endpointslicemirroring-controller,
|
|
generic-garbage-collector,
|
|
horizontal-pod-autoscaler,
|
|
job-controller,
|
|
namespace-controller,
|
|
node-controller,
|
|
persistent-volume-binder,
|
|
pod-garbage-collector,
|
|
pv-protection-controller,
|
|
pvc-protection-controller,
|
|
replicaset-controller,
|
|
resourcequota-controller,
|
|
root-ca-cert-publisher,
|
|
service-account-controller,
|
|
statefulset-controller
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
- macro: trusted_sa
|
|
condition: (ka.target.name in (known_sa_list, user_known_sa_list))
|
|
|
|
# Detect creating a service account in the kube-system/kube-public namespace
|
|
- rule: Service Account Created in Kube Namespace
|
|
desc: Detect any attempt to create a serviceaccount in the kube-system or kube-public namespaces
|
|
condition: kevt and serviceaccount and kcreate and ka.target.namespace in (kube-system, kube-public) and response_successful and not trusted_sa
|
|
output: Service account created in kube namespace (user=%ka.user.name serviceaccount=%ka.target.name resource=%ka.target.resource ns=%ka.target.namespace)
|
|
priority: WARNING
|
|
source: k8s_audit
|
|
tags: [k8s]
|
|
|
|
# Detect any modify/delete to any ClusterRole starting with
|
|
# "system:". "system:coredns" is excluded as changes are expected in
|
|
# normal operation.
|
|
- rule: System ClusterRole Modified/Deleted
|
|
desc: Detect any attempt to modify/delete a ClusterRole/Role starting with system
|
|
condition: kevt and (role or clusterrole) and (kmodify or kdelete) and (ka.target.name startswith "system:") and
|
|
not ka.target.name in (system:coredns, system:managed-certificate-controller)
|
|
output: System ClusterRole/Role modified or deleted (user=%ka.user.name role=%ka.target.name resource=%ka.target.resource ns=%ka.target.namespace action=%ka.verb)
|
|
priority: WARNING
|
|
source: k8s_audit
|
|
tags: [k8s]
|
|
|
|
# Detect any attempt to create a ClusterRoleBinding to the cluster-admin user
|
|
# (expand this to any built-in cluster role that does "sensitive" things)
|
|
- rule: Attach to cluster-admin Role
|
|
desc: Detect any attempt to create a ClusterRoleBinding to the cluster-admin user
|
|
condition: kevt and clusterrolebinding and kcreate and ka.req.binding.role=cluster-admin
|
|
output: Cluster Role Binding to cluster-admin role (user=%ka.user.name subject=%ka.req.binding.subjects)
|
|
priority: WARNING
|
|
source: k8s_audit
|
|
tags: [k8s]
|
|
|
|
- rule: ClusterRole With Wildcard Created
|
|
desc: Detect any attempt to create a Role/ClusterRole with wildcard resources or verbs
|
|
condition: kevt and (role or clusterrole) and kcreate and (ka.req.role.rules.resources intersects ("*") or ka.req.role.rules.verbs intersects ("*"))
|
|
output: Created Role/ClusterRole with wildcard (user=%ka.user.name role=%ka.target.name resource=%ka.target.resource rules=%ka.req.role.rules)
|
|
priority: WARNING
|
|
source: k8s_audit
|
|
tags: [k8s]
|
|
|
|
- macro: writable_verbs
|
|
condition: >
|
|
(ka.req.role.rules.verbs intersects (create, update, patch, delete, deletecollection))
|
|
|
|
- rule: ClusterRole With Write Privileges Created
|
|
desc: Detect any attempt to create a Role/ClusterRole that can perform write-related actions
|
|
condition: kevt and (role or clusterrole) and kcreate and writable_verbs
|
|
output: Created Role/ClusterRole with write privileges (user=%ka.user.name role=%ka.target.name resource=%ka.target.resource rules=%ka.req.role.rules)
|
|
priority: NOTICE
|
|
source: k8s_audit
|
|
tags: [k8s]
|
|
|
|
- rule: ClusterRole With Pod Exec Created
|
|
desc: Detect any attempt to create a Role/ClusterRole that can exec to pods
|
|
condition: kevt and (role or clusterrole) and kcreate and ka.req.role.rules.resources intersects ("pods/exec")
|
|
output: Created Role/ClusterRole with pod exec privileges (user=%ka.user.name role=%ka.target.name resource=%ka.target.resource rules=%ka.req.role.rules)
|
|
priority: WARNING
|
|
source: k8s_audit
|
|
tags: [k8s]
|
|
|
|
# The rules below this point are less discriminatory and generally
|
|
# represent a stream of activity for a cluster. If you wish to disable
|
|
# these events, modify the following macro.
|
|
- macro: consider_activity_events
|
|
condition: (k8s_audit_always_true)
|
|
|
|
- macro: kactivity
|
|
condition: (kevt and consider_activity_events)
|
|
|
|
- rule: K8s Deployment Created
|
|
desc: Detect any attempt to create a deployment
|
|
condition: (kactivity and kcreate and deployment and response_successful)
|
|
output: K8s Deployment Created (user=%ka.user.name deployment=%ka.target.name ns=%ka.target.namespace resource=%ka.target.resource resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
|
|
priority: INFO
|
|
source: k8s_audit
|
|
tags: [k8s]
|
|
|
|
- rule: K8s Deployment Deleted
|
|
desc: Detect any attempt to delete a deployment
|
|
condition: (kactivity and kdelete and deployment and response_successful)
|
|
output: K8s Deployment Deleted (user=%ka.user.name deployment=%ka.target.name ns=%ka.target.namespace resource=%ka.target.resource resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
|
|
priority: INFO
|
|
source: k8s_audit
|
|
tags: [k8s]
|
|
|
|
- rule: K8s Service Created
|
|
desc: Detect any attempt to create a service
|
|
condition: (kactivity and kcreate and service and response_successful)
|
|
output: K8s Service Created (user=%ka.user.name service=%ka.target.name ns=%ka.target.namespace resource=%ka.target.resource resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
|
|
priority: INFO
|
|
source: k8s_audit
|
|
tags: [k8s]
|
|
|
|
- rule: K8s Service Deleted
|
|
desc: Detect any attempt to delete a service
|
|
condition: (kactivity and kdelete and service and response_successful)
|
|
output: K8s Service Deleted (user=%ka.user.name service=%ka.target.name ns=%ka.target.namespace resource=%ka.target.resource resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
|
|
priority: INFO
|
|
source: k8s_audit
|
|
tags: [k8s]
|
|
|
|
- rule: K8s ConfigMap Created
|
|
desc: Detect any attempt to create a configmap
|
|
condition: (kactivity and kcreate and configmap and response_successful)
|
|
output: K8s ConfigMap Created (user=%ka.user.name configmap=%ka.target.name ns=%ka.target.namespace resource=%ka.target.resource resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
|
|
priority: INFO
|
|
source: k8s_audit
|
|
tags: [k8s]
|
|
|
|
- rule: K8s ConfigMap Deleted
|
|
desc: Detect any attempt to delete a configmap
|
|
condition: (kactivity and kdelete and configmap and response_successful)
|
|
output: K8s ConfigMap Deleted (user=%ka.user.name configmap=%ka.target.name ns=%ka.target.namespace resource=%ka.target.resource resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
|
|
priority: INFO
|
|
source: k8s_audit
|
|
tags: [k8s]
|
|
|
|
- rule: K8s Namespace Created
|
|
desc: Detect any attempt to create a namespace
|
|
condition: (kactivity and kcreate and namespace and response_successful)
|
|
output: K8s Namespace Created (user=%ka.user.name namespace=%ka.target.name resource=%ka.target.resource resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
|
|
priority: INFO
|
|
source: k8s_audit
|
|
tags: [k8s]
|
|
|
|
- rule: K8s Namespace Deleted
|
|
desc: Detect any attempt to delete a namespace
|
|
condition: (kactivity and non_system_user and kdelete and namespace and response_successful)
|
|
output: K8s Namespace Deleted (user=%ka.user.name namespace=%ka.target.name resource=%ka.target.resource resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
|
|
priority: INFO
|
|
source: k8s_audit
|
|
tags: [k8s]
|
|
|
|
- rule: K8s Serviceaccount Created
|
|
desc: Detect any attempt to create a service account
|
|
condition: (kactivity and kcreate and serviceaccount and response_successful)
|
|
output: K8s Serviceaccount Created (user=%ka.user.name serviceaccount=%ka.target.name ns=%ka.target.namespace resource=%ka.target.resource resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
|
|
priority: INFO
|
|
source: k8s_audit
|
|
tags: [k8s]
|
|
|
|
- rule: K8s Serviceaccount Deleted
|
|
desc: Detect any attempt to delete a service account
|
|
condition: (kactivity and kdelete and serviceaccount and response_successful)
|
|
output: K8s Serviceaccount Deleted (user=%ka.user.name serviceaccount=%ka.target.name ns=%ka.target.namespace resource=%ka.target.resource resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
|
|
priority: INFO
|
|
source: k8s_audit
|
|
tags: [k8s]
|
|
|
|
- rule: K8s Role/Clusterrole Created
|
|
desc: Detect any attempt to create a cluster role/role
|
|
condition: (kactivity and kcreate and (clusterrole or role) and response_successful)
|
|
output: K8s Cluster Role Created (user=%ka.user.name role=%ka.target.name resource=%ka.target.resource rules=%ka.req.role.rules resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
|
|
priority: INFO
|
|
source: k8s_audit
|
|
tags: [k8s]
|
|
|
|
- rule: K8s Role/Clusterrole Deleted
|
|
desc: Detect any attempt to delete a cluster role/role
|
|
condition: (kactivity and kdelete and (clusterrole or role) and response_successful)
|
|
output: K8s Cluster Role Deleted (user=%ka.user.name role=%ka.target.name resource=%ka.target.resource resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
|
|
priority: INFO
|
|
source: k8s_audit
|
|
tags: [k8s]
|
|
|
|
- rule: K8s Role/Clusterrolebinding Created
|
|
desc: Detect any attempt to create a clusterrolebinding
|
|
condition: (kactivity and kcreate and clusterrolebinding and response_successful)
|
|
output: K8s Cluster Role Binding Created (user=%ka.user.name binding=%ka.target.name resource=%ka.target.resource subjects=%ka.req.binding.subjects role=%ka.req.binding.role resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
|
|
priority: INFO
|
|
source: k8s_audit
|
|
tags: [k8s]
|
|
|
|
- rule: K8s Role/Clusterrolebinding Deleted
|
|
desc: Detect any attempt to delete a clusterrolebinding
|
|
condition: (kactivity and kdelete and clusterrolebinding and response_successful)
|
|
output: K8s Cluster Role Binding Deleted (user=%ka.user.name binding=%ka.target.name resource=%ka.target.resource resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
|
|
priority: INFO
|
|
source: k8s_audit
|
|
tags: [k8s]
|
|
|
|
- rule: K8s Secret Created
|
|
desc: Detect any attempt to create a secret. Service account tokens are excluded.
|
|
condition: (kactivity and kcreate and secret and ka.target.namespace!=kube-system and non_system_user and response_successful)
|
|
output: K8s Secret Created (user=%ka.user.name secret=%ka.target.name ns=%ka.target.namespace resource=%ka.target.resource resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
|
|
priority: INFO
|
|
source: k8s_audit
|
|
tags: [k8s]
|
|
|
|
- rule: K8s Secret Deleted
|
|
desc: Detect any attempt to delete a secret. Service account tokens are excluded.
|
|
condition: (kactivity and kdelete and secret and ka.target.namespace!=kube-system and non_system_user and response_successful)
|
|
output: K8s Secret Deleted (user=%ka.user.name secret=%ka.target.name ns=%ka.target.namespace resource=%ka.target.resource resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
|
|
priority: INFO
|
|
source: k8s_audit
|
|
tags: [k8s]
|
|
|
|
- rule: K8s Secret Get Successfully
|
|
desc: >
|
|
Detect any attempt to get a secret. Service account tokens are excluded.
|
|
condition: >
|
|
secret and kget
|
|
and kactivity
|
|
and response_successful
|
|
output: K8s Secret Get Successfully (user=%ka.user.name secret=%ka.target.name ns=%ka.target.namespace resource=%ka.target.resource resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
|
|
priority: ERROR
|
|
source: k8s_audit
|
|
tags: [k8s]
|
|
|
|
- rule: K8s Secret Get Unsuccessfully Tried
|
|
desc: >
|
|
Detect an unsuccessful attempt to get the secret. Service account tokens are excluded.
|
|
condition: >
|
|
secret and kget
|
|
and kactivity
|
|
and not response_successful
|
|
output: K8s Secret Get Unsuccessfully Tried (user=%ka.user.name secret=%ka.target.name ns=%ka.target.namespace resource=%ka.target.resource resp=%ka.response.code decision=%ka.auth.decision reason=%ka.auth.reason)
|
|
priority: WARNING
|
|
source: k8s_audit
|
|
tags: [k8s]
|
|
|
|
# This rule generally matches all events, and as a result is disabled
|
|
# by default. If you wish to enable these events, modify the
|
|
# following macro.
|
|
# condition: (jevt.rawtime exists)
|
|
- macro: consider_all_events
|
|
condition: (k8s_audit_never_true)
|
|
|
|
- macro: kall
|
|
condition: (kevt and consider_all_events)
|
|
|
|
- rule: All K8s Audit Events
|
|
desc: Match all K8s Audit Events
|
|
condition: kall
|
|
output: K8s Audit Event received (user=%ka.user.name verb=%ka.verb uri=%ka.uri obj=%jevt.obj)
|
|
priority: DEBUG
|
|
source: k8s_audit
|
|
tags: [k8s]
|
|
|
|
|
|
# This macro disables following rule, change to k8s_audit_never_true to enable it
|
|
- macro: allowed_full_admin_users
|
|
condition: (k8s_audit_always_true)
|
|
|
|
# This list includes some of the default user names for an administrator in several K8s installations
|
|
- list: full_admin_k8s_users
|
|
items: ["admin", "kubernetes-admin", "kubernetes-admin@kubernetes", "kubernetes-admin@cluster.local", "minikube-user"]
|
|
|
|
# This rules detect an operation triggered by an user name that is
|
|
# included in the list of those that are default administrators upon
|
|
# cluster creation. This may signify a permission setting too broader.
|
|
# As we can't check for role of the user on a general ka.* event, this
|
|
# may or may not be an administrator. Customize the full_admin_k8s_users
|
|
# list to your needs, and activate at your discretion.
|
|
|
|
# # How to test:
|
|
# # Execute any kubectl command connected using default cluster user, as:
|
|
# kubectl create namespace rule-test
|
|
|
|
- rule: Full K8s Administrative Access
|
|
desc: Detect any k8s operation by a user name that may be an administrator with full access.
|
|
condition: >
|
|
kevt
|
|
and non_system_user
|
|
and ka.user.name in (full_admin_k8s_users)
|
|
and not allowed_full_admin_users
|
|
output: K8s Operation performed by full admin user (user=%ka.user.name target=%ka.target.name/%ka.target.resource verb=%ka.verb uri=%ka.uri resp=%ka.response.code)
|
|
priority: WARNING
|
|
source: k8s_audit
|
|
tags: [k8s]
|
|
|
|
- macro: ingress
|
|
condition: ka.target.resource=ingresses
|
|
|
|
- macro: ingress_tls
|
|
condition: (jevt.value[/requestObject/spec/tls] exists)
|
|
|
|
# # How to test:
|
|
# # Create an ingress.yaml file with content:
|
|
# apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1beta1
|
|
# kind: Ingress
|
|
# metadata:
|
|
# name: test-ingress
|
|
# annotations:
|
|
# nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/rewrite-target: /
|
|
# spec:
|
|
# rules:
|
|
# - http:
|
|
# paths:
|
|
# - path: /testpath
|
|
# backend:
|
|
# serviceName: test
|
|
# servicePort: 80
|
|
# # Execute: kubectl apply -f ingress.yaml
|
|
|
|
- rule: Ingress Object without TLS Certificate Created
|
|
desc: Detect any attempt to create an ingress without TLS certification.
|
|
condition: >
|
|
(kactivity and kcreate and ingress and response_successful and not ingress_tls)
|
|
output: >
|
|
K8s Ingress Without TLS Cert Created (user=%ka.user.name ingress=%ka.target.name
|
|
namespace=%ka.target.namespace resource=%ka.target.resource)
|
|
source: k8s_audit
|
|
priority: WARNING
|
|
tags: [k8s, network]
|
|
|
|
- macro: node
|
|
condition: ka.target.resource=nodes
|
|
|
|
- macro: allow_all_k8s_nodes
|
|
condition: (k8s_audit_always_true)
|
|
|
|
- list: allowed_k8s_nodes
|
|
items: []
|
|
|
|
# # How to test:
|
|
# # Create a Falco monitored cluster with Kops
|
|
# # Increase the number of minimum nodes with:
|
|
# kops edit ig nodes
|
|
# kops apply --yes
|
|
|
|
- rule: Untrusted Node Successfully Joined the Cluster
|
|
desc: >
|
|
Detect a node successfully joined the cluster outside of the list of allowed nodes.
|
|
condition: >
|
|
kevt and node
|
|
and kcreate
|
|
and response_successful
|
|
and not allow_all_k8s_nodes
|
|
and not ka.target.name in (allowed_k8s_nodes)
|
|
output: Node not in allowed list successfully joined the cluster (user=%ka.user.name node=%ka.target.name resource=%ka.target.resource)
|
|
priority: ERROR
|
|
source: k8s_audit
|
|
tags: [k8s]
|
|
|
|
- rule: Untrusted Node Unsuccessfully Tried to Join the Cluster
|
|
desc: >
|
|
Detect an unsuccessful attempt to join the cluster for a node not in the list of allowed nodes.
|
|
condition: >
|
|
kevt and node
|
|
and kcreate
|
|
and not response_successful
|
|
and not allow_all_k8s_nodes
|
|
and not ka.target.name in (allowed_k8s_nodes)
|
|
output: Node not in allowed list tried unsuccessfully to join the cluster (user=%ka.user.name node=%ka.target.name reason=%ka.response.reason resource=%ka.target.resource)
|
|
priority: WARNING
|
|
source: k8s_audit
|
|
tags: [k8s]
|